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SUMMARY 
 
Sexual harassment has been in existence for a long time in the workplace without 
any attempt to understand, define and effectively combat this rather undesirable and 
serious form of misconduct.  Until fairly recently, the growing problem of sexual 
harassment and its damaging effect have been given much attention by legal 
authorities and society at large.  The effect of sexual harassment is that it 
embarrasses or humiliates the victim.  The victim may also suffer from trauma which, 
in turn, affects his/her performance at work. 
 
Numerous definitions have been provided on what constitutes sexual harassment.  
Sexual harassment takes place when a women‟s sexual role overshadows her work 
role in the eyes of the male, whether it be a supervisor, co-worker, client or customer. 
In other words, her gender receives more attention than her work.  Sexual 
harassment is also seen as unwanted conduct of a sexual nature that violates the 
rights of an employee and constitutes a barrier to equity in the workplace.1 
 
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution2 entrenches the rights of everyone. Worth 
mentioning are the “right to equality”, “the right to dignity”, “the right to privacy” and 
“the right to fair labour practices”.  Furthermore, section 6(3) of the Employment 
Equity Act3 states that “harassment is a form of unfair discrimination” which is 
prohibited in terms of section 6(1) of the same Act.  Section 60 of the Employment 
Equity Act deals with statutory vicarious liability where the employer is held liable for 
his acts and/or omission to take measures to against sexual harassment or a failure 
to put a grievance procedure in place.  Where such an employer has done what is 
reasonably necessary to prevent and to address sexual harassment, he/she will 
escape liability for the misconduct of the employee.  This section also provides for 
mechanisms that an employer may employ to minimise liability where harassment 
has taken place. 
 
                                                 
1
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. 
2
  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
3
  The Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases at Work of 2005. 
iv 
In addition to statutory vicarious liability is the common law vicarious liability, where 
the employer is vicariously liable for the delict of the employee.  This form of liability 
is also referred to as “no-fault liability”.  The employer will be held liable where the 
following requirements for vicarious liability in common law are met: firstly, there must 
be an “employer-employee relationship”, secondly, a “delict must be committed” and 
thirdly, the “employee must have been acting in the scope or course of employment 
when the delict was committed”. 
 
Liability can also be directly imputed on the employer. In this instance, it has to be 
proven that “the employer committed an act or omission; the act or omission was 
unlawful; the act or omission was culpable, intentional or negligent, and a third party 
suffered harm; either patrimonial damage or injury to personality; and the act or 
omission caused that harm”. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO VICARIOUS LIABLITY 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
Harassment, and particularly sexual harassment, remains pervasive in workplaces 
around the world.4  Unfortunately, there is also no indication that this offensive 
conduct will be stamped out within the foreseeable future.5  In an attempt to identify 
the reasons for this pervasiveness, many academic writers are unanimous in the fact 
that harassment is about an “abuse of power”.6  This is particularly true where the 
harasser is in a supervisory position and thus able to exert „real‟ economic power 
over his victim (so-called quid pro quo harassment, where the victim faces loss of 
tangible job benefit such as promotion or salary increase if she does not comply 
sexually).7 
 
Although sexual harassment is not directed at women only, it is accepted that more 
women than men are victims of sexual harassment.8  According to Dolkart,9 whatever 
form the harassment takes or whoever the victim might be, the effect of harassment 
is often devastating: 
 
“The effects of sexual harassment on a victim‟s job and career can be profound. 
Many employees will simply leave the job or request a transfer than endure the 
harassment until they are psychologically destroyed. In one study, 42% of the 
victims of sexual harassment left their job, and another 24% were fired.  Thus, 
66% of the victims in the study were driven out of their job by sexual harassment.  
The costs of leaving a job include not only the obvious ones like loss of income 
and seniority, but also a disrupted work history, problems with obtaining 
references for future jobs, loss of confidence in seeking a new job, and loss of 
career advancement.  Even for those who remain in their jobs, there are 
significant costs, including adverse working conditions and diminished 
opportunities for advancement.  For instance, employees subject to a hostile work 
environment may not feel welcome as credible colleagues, may feel excluded or 
                                                 
4
  Garbers “Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: Different Approaches, Persistent 
Problems” (2002) SA Merc LJ 371 n2, 376n 16. 
5
  Ryder Devising a Sexual Harassment Policy People Dynamics (1998) 27. 
6
   Basson “Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Overview of Developments” (2007) Stell LR 
425 436. 
7
  Ibid. 
8
  Ntsabo v Real Security CC (2003) 24 ILJ 2341 (LC) 2377A. 
9
  Dolkart “Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity and the Shaping of Legal 
Standards” (1994) Emory LJ 151 187-188. 
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segregated, or may lose confidence in them as workers.  Those in supervisory 
positions may feel undermined as managers.  Needless to say, difficulties at work 
and and/or loss of income, as well as psychological injury have a negative impact 
on relationships with family and friends.” 
 
There are far-reaching consequences to sexual harassment.  Sexual harassment is 
an unpleasant aspect of the modern working environment such that it erodes the 
trust necessary in any working relationship and tends to act as a factor blocking the 
advancement of women in the work-place.10  It has become more marked with the 
recent changes in societal patterns, as more women enter the labour market and has 
recently received attention with the rise of feminism, particularly in America.11  Sexual 
harassment is in many senses a moral issue, and it should be borne in mind that 
there is considerable controversy over whether the law should reflect the mores of a 
society and the extent to which the law should be used to enforce morality.12  But 
sexual harassment is more than a moral issue, for it affects the legitimate interests of 
female employees.13 
 
It is important to examine sexual harassment in a South African context.  Given the 
pervasiveness of violence against women, it is not surprising that the rate of sexual 
harassment in South Africa is very high ranging from 35% to 76% of women 
surveyed.14  
 
Gender, class and race structure virtually all social relations within South Africa, 
although in most societies, few have such institutionalized divisions as South Africa.15  
When women constitute the majority of workers in a given workplace, but hold what 
generally have been considered “women‟s jobs”, the form of sexual harassment is 
likely to be “jobs for sex”.16  In South Africa, as elsewhere, women are generally in 
                                                 
10
  Mowatt “Sexual Harassment - New Remedy for an Old Wrong” (1986) ILJ 652. 
11
  Ibid. 
12
  Hart Law, Liberty and Morality (1963) 51. 
13
  Mowatt “Sexual Harassment-Old Remedies for a New Wrong” (1987) ILJ 439. 
14
   Halfkenny “Legal and Workplace Solutions to Sexual Harassment in South Africa part 2: The 
South African Experience” (1996) 213 214. 
15
  Meer “Black Women-Workers” (1991) 37-8. 
16
  Husbands “Sexual Harassment Law in Employment: An International Perspective” (1992) LR 
535 535-6. 
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junior positions in relation to the male managers and supervisors, who see sexual 
favours as part of the job.17 
 
The effects and form that sexual harassment takes vary.  Where women are few in 
number, entering skilled blue-collar or professional occupations traditionally 
considered to be “men‟s work”, harassment will likely be verbal and physical abuse 
by male co-workers designed to humiliate women and drive them from the 
workplace.18  It is generally agreed that the effect of sexual harassment in the short 
term is to make the victim “embarrassed, disillusioned or humiliated” and, in some 
instances her “work performance may suffer”.19  In the longer term, however, it 
appears that career commitment is lowered and many may feel forced to resign or 
request a transfer.20   
 
The aim of this treatise is to provide a detailed exposition of the extent of the 
employer‟s liability in sexual harassment cases.  The treatise aims to establish clear 
guidelines on the circumstances under which an employer may be fairly and 
reasonably held liable for the misconduct of the employee.  Further, the treatise will 
also look at the rights of the employee against sexual harassment at work and the 
prerogative of the employer to put measures in place to prevent harassment.  
Furthermore, the remedies at the disposal of the employee against an employer who 
fails to ensure a safe working environment will be addressed.  Vicarious liability can 
be determined in terms of the Constitution and the Employment Equity Act and in 
terms of the common law.  Liability in terms of the common law is two-pronged.  
Firstly, it can be direct liability and, secondly, vicarious. Therefore, the concepts of 
statutory and common law vicarious liability will form the greater component of this 
treatise.  Reference will be made to common law and statutory interpretations, as 
well as case law.  
 
                                                 
17
  Halfkenny “Legal and Workplace Solutions to Sexual Harassment in South Africa part 2: The 
South African Experience” (1996) 213 214. 
18
   Schultz “Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretation of Sex Segregation in 
the Workplace in the Title in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument” Harvard Law 
Review 1749. 
19
  Mowatt “Sexual Harassment-New Remedy for an Old Wrong” (1986) ILJ 638. 
20
  Ibid. 
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In light of the foregoing background and with the objective of determining the extent 
of the employer‟s liability for acts of sexual harassment by employees, the court‟s 
stance of the proper approach to adopt in imputing liability on employers will be 
discussed.  Firstly, in chapter one, the various definitions of sexual harassment and 
their application in the employment context will be provided.  Secondly, in chapter 
two, a discussion of the statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa of 1996 and the Employment Equity Act and their 
application in case law will follow.  Thirdly, chapter three will focus on the common 
law delictual liability of the employer.  
 
The first part of chapter three will discuss whether the employer can be held directly 
liable for the delict of the employee.  Thus to establish direct liability all the elements 
of a delict will have to be met in order to succeed.  These elements are: “Conduct”, 
“Causation”, “Wrongfulness”, “Damage”, and “Fault”.  The second part if this chapter 
will deal with the concept of vicarious liability.  This seeks to ascertain whether and to 
what extent the employer can be held liable for acts which he is not responsible (no 
fault liability).  
 
The discussion is subsequently concluded in Chapter 4.  Based on research, the 
author will evaluate vicarious liability relating to sexual harassment. 
 
1.2 DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
A comprehensive definition of sexual harassment is needed.  Sexual harassment 
was, until recently, “an experience without a name …” 21 and the very scope of the 
expression “sexual harassment” is one of its difficulties as the concept lacks legal 
definition.  There is a need to describe more precisely, in legal terms, what sexual 
harassment is.22  However, before one attempts to define sexual harassment; “[i]n 
the traditional social context, entering into a sexual union requires one party 
(normally the male) to take the initiative”.  Furthermore, office romances are not 
uncommon, and there is no reason why a consensual sexual relationship between 
two people in the same employment environment should not be regarded as normal.  
                                                 
21
  Mowatt “Sexual Harassment-Old Remedies for a New Wrong” 1987 ILJ 439 at 442. 
22
  Supra at 441. 
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After all, many people have little opportunity of meeting others than in a work 
situation.23 
 
Prior to the new labour dispensation in 1995, there existed no legislative definition of 
sexual harassment.24  Courts were left to their own devices to find an acceptable 
definition, often with reference to overseas developments.25  Neither the 
Constitution,26 nor the Employment Equity Act,27 defines sexual harassment.  
However, section 9(3) of the Constitution28 records an express prohibition on unfair 
discrimination and that section 10 recognises that “[e]very person shall have the right 
to respect for and protection of his or her dignity”. 
 
Furthermore, the Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment 
Cases (hereinafter referred to as “The Code of Good Practice”),29 originating from the 
terms of section 54 of the Employment Equity Act,30 defines sexual harassment as 
follows:31 
 
“11 (1) unwanted conduct of a sexual nature.  The unwanted nature of sexual 
harassment distinguishes it from behaviour that is welcome and 
mutual. 
  
 (2) Sexual attention becomes harassment if: - 
 
 (a) the behaviour is persistent; 
 
 (b) the recipient has made it clear that the behaviour is considered 
offensive and/or 
 
 (c) the perpetrator should have known that the behaviour is 
regarded as unacceptable.” 
 
 
                                                 
23
  Harrison & Lee “Love at Work” (1986) Personnel Management January 20. 
24
  Basson “Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Overview of Developments” (2007) Stell LR 
436. 
25
   Garbers (2002) SA Merc LJ 393-395. 
26
   The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. 
27
    55 of 1998. 
28
    108 of 1996. 
29
  Of July 1998.In the Draft Bill on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (GG14591 of 
Feb 1993) it was stated that: “Sexual harassment means any conduct where a person makes an 
unwelcome sexual suggestion to another person ...” 
30
   55 of 1998. 
31
   Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (s 3). 
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In her criticism of this definition, Cooper32 argues that the definition is “awkwardly 
written”.  One of the problems identified by her is the “and/or” terminology which links 
the three paragraphs of sub item (2).  She argues that as a result of this terminology, 
each of the three paragraphs could, on its own, constitute sexual harassment.  
Section 6(3) of the Employment Equity Act33 plainly defines “harassment” as a form 
of „unfair discrimination‟ and states that it is prohibited on any one of the listed 
grounds in section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act.34  These grounds include the 
following: 
 
“6. Prohibition of unfair discrimination. 
 
(1) No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an 
employee,  
 
In the employment policy or practice, on one or more ground, including 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy …” 
 
The court in J v M35 defined sexual harassment “unwanted sexual attention in the 
employment environment”: 
 
“[I]n its narrowest form sexual harassment occurs when a woman (or a man) is 
expected to engage in sexual activity in order to obtain or keep employment or 
obtain promotion or other favourable working conditions.  In its wider view it is, 
however, any unwanted sexual behaviour or comment which has a negative 
effect on the recipient.  Conduct which can constitute sexual harassment ranges 
from innuendo, inappropriate gestures, suggestions or hints or fondling without 
consent or by force to its worse form, namely rape.  It is … also not necessary 
that the conduct must be repeated.  A single act can constitute sexual 
harassment. 
 
This broad definition of sexual harassment covers both „jobs for sex‟ and 
harassment which „creates an intimidating, hostile and offensive work 
environment‟.” 
 
 
In addition, the 2005 Code36 defines sexual harassment as follows:   
 
                                                 
32
  Cooper “Harassment on the Basis of Sex and Gender: A form of Unfair Discrimination” (2002) 
ILJ 127. 
33
  55 of 1998. 
34
  55 of 1998. 
35
  J v M Ltd (1989) ILJ 755 (IC). 
36
  The Code of Good Practice on Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases 2005. 
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“Sexual harassment is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that violates the 
rights of an employee and constitutes a barrier to equity in the workplace, taking 
into account all the following factors: 
 
1.1 whether the harassment is on the prohibited grounds of sex and/or gender 
and/or sexual orientation; 
 
1.2 whether the sexual conduct was unwelcome; 
 
1.3 the nature and extent of the sexual conduct; and 
 
1.4 the impact of the sexual conduct on the employee.” 
 
Section 6(3) of the Employment Equity Act37 plainly defines “harassment” as a form 
of unfair discrimination and states that it is prohibited on any one of the listed 
grounds in section 6(1).  According to Mowatt38 sexual harassment occurs when “a 
women‟s sex role overshadows her work role in the eyes of the male, whether it be a 
supervisor, co- worker, client or customer; in other words, her gender receives more 
attention than her work”. 
 
The law imposes a duty on the employer.  Halfkenny39 alludes to the fact that in the J 
v M40 case the court placed an affirmative duty on an employer “to ensure that its 
employees are not subjected to this form of violation within the workplace”.  Although 
it is quite seldom that the employer himself is guilty of sexual harassment, such an 
employer will almost always be involved in any litigation that may result therefrom.41  
 
Where the employer exploits his more powerful position to impose sexual demands 
on a female employee, it will amount to sexual harassment.  Inherent in this view of 
sexual harassment are three elements: first, “an abuse of power by the employer”, 
secondly, the abuse of power amounts to some form of “coercion”, and thirdly, the 
“purpose of the coercion is to obtain some form of sexual favour from the 
employee”.42  In this context, sexual harassment may be seen as arising from the 
                                                 
37
  55 of 1998. 
38
  Nieva & Gutek Women and Work; A Psychological Perspective (1981) 63. 
39
  Halfkenny “Legal and Workplace Solutions to Sexual Harassment in South Africa: The South 
African Experience” (1996) ILJ 215. 
40
  J v M Ltd (1989) ILJ 755 (IC). 
41
  Smit & Van Der Nest “When Sisters are Doing it for Themselves: Sexual Harassment Claims in 
the Workplace” (2004) TSAR 534. 
42
  Harvard Law Review (1984) 1449 at 1451. 
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employment relationship; “but it arises essentially out of the personal proclivities of 
the parties involved”.  It is, therefore, “a personal rather than social phenomenon”.43  
                                                 
43
  Harvard Law Review 1452. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STATUTORY VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
Numerous statutory enactments which seek to combat sexual harassment have been 
promulgated.  These include amongst others: the Employment Equity Act (hereinafter 
EEA),44 the Labour Relations Act (hereinafter LRA),45 and the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (hereinafter PEPUDA).46  Sexual 
harassment is “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that violates the rights of an 
employee and constitutes a barrier to equality in the workplace”.47  Statutory 
vicarious liability relates to the employer‟s liability “for the sexual harassment 
committed by an employee against another employee”48 in terms of the Constitution49 
and the Employment Equity Act50 in particular. 
 
The above pieces of legislation have to be interpreted in light of the Constitution.51  In 
this chapter I shall firstly discuss the rights of individuals entrenched in the 
Constitution and the right of employers to fair labour practices.  Secondly, I will look 
at the Employment Equity Act with special attention to the definition of sexual 
harassment and its classification as a form of discrimination.  Thereafter the chapter 
will deal with the courts‟ interpretation of sections 6 and 60 in case law and 
subsequently the measures at the disposal of the employer to avoid liability.  
Important case law which will be referred to include: Ntsabo v Real Security;52 
SATAWU v Old Mutual Insurance Limited and Burger,53 Mokoena v Garden Art (Pty) 
Ltd.54 
 
                                                 
44
   55 of 1998. 
45
   66 of 1995. 
46
  Promotion  of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
47
   Code of Good Practice on Handling of Sexual Harassment at Work of 2005. 
48
  Le Roux et al Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law, Policies and Processes (2005) 79. 
49
   108 of 1996. 
50
  55 of 1998. 
51
  S 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. 
52
   Ntsabo v Real Security CC (2003) 24 ILJ 2431 (LC). 
53
   SATAWU obo Finca v Old Mutual Life Insurance Company (SA) Ltd and Burger [2006] 8 BLLR 
737 (LC). 
54
  Mokoena v Garden Art (Pty) Ltd [2008] BLLR 428 (LC). 
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2.2 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA OF 1996 
 
The interim Constitution55 guarantees fair labour practices and prohibits 
discrimination based on “race, gender, sex or sexual orientation”.  Consistent with 
other modern constitutions, the Bill of Rights does not only concern itself with “public 
power” (for example, state-individual relationships), but in certain instances it also 
applies to the “exercise of private power” (such as power exercised by a natural or 
juristic person).56  
 
According to Le Roux,57 “whenever it is alleged that the conduct of a person infringes 
the fundamental rights of others, the question must be asked whether the particular 
fundamental right is capable of application to private relationships”.58  Once a court is 
satisfied that a provision of the Bill of Rights applies to private relationships, it must 
determine whether there is legislation giving effect to the fundamental right.  If there 
is such legislation it must be applied.59  If there is no such legislation, the court must 
consider whether the “common law gives effect to the right”.60  If there is no common 
law giving effect to the right, the court must develop the common law to give effect to 
that right.61 
 
Accordingly, it could be argued that the Constitution62 already imposes on the 
government an “affirmative obligation to prevent sexual harassment beyond its clear 
duty not to harass its own employees”.63  Moreover, under the constitutional 
guarantees of “equality, dignity and security of the person”, arguably there would be 
a constitutional violation when a government worker is harassed by a supervisor, with 
corresponding liability for damages.64 
 
                                                 
55
  Interim Constitution of 1993. 
56
  Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 1-2. 
57
  Le Roux et al Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law, Policies and Processes (2005) 15. 
58
   S 8(3) Constitution 108 of 1996. 
59
  Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC). 
60
   S 8(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. 
61
   De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 4
th
 ed (2001) 55-57. 
62
  108 of 1996. 
63
  Halfkenny “Legal and Workplace Solutions to Sexual Harassment in South Africa (Part 2): The 
South African Experience” (1996) 17 ILJ 213. 
64
  There is no question that a discriminatory act by the SA government as an employer, or a 
provincial and municipal government employer would be covered by chapter 3, which binds all 
legislative and executive organs of state. 
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The Constitution65 also provides a rights framework for interpretation of existing law 
and the enactment of appropriate legislation to deal with the question of sexual 
harassment.66 
 
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution67 does not specifically refer to sexual 
harassment; however, it includes the “right to equality”, more specifically the “right 
not to be unfairly discriminated against”, and the “right to fair labour practices”.  Other 
relevant fundamental rights include the “right to dignity” (section 10) and the “right to 
privacy” (section 12), but these rights are most likely to be protected via the common 
law (the law of delict) or via a development of the common law.68 
 
With regard to the right to equality, the EEA69 and the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act70 (hereinafter “PEPUDA”) are the legislation 
that give effect to this fundamental right.71  Therefore, the application of this 
fundamental right will enter the sphere of the workplace via the EEA.  In addition, 
PEPUDA72 will apply to cases of unfair discrimination outside the labour environment.  
With regard to the right to fair labour practices, the LRA73 is the legislation that gives 
effect to this right. 
 
Although discrimination (in this case sexual harassment) is dealt with specifically in 
the EEA74 and PEPUDA,75 when interpreting these statutes, particular attention must 
be paid to the constitutional “right to equality” and the Constitutional Court‟s approach 
to the application of this right.76  This is also stated in the preamble of the EEA.77  In 
this regard, the test for “unfair discrimination and the support of substantive equality, 
                                                 
65
  108 of 1996. 
66
   Supra 222. 
67
  108 of 1996. 
68
  Le Roux et al “Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law, Policies and Processes” (2005) 17. 
69
   55 of 1998. 
70
   4 of 2000. 
71
  Mukheibir & Ristow “An Overview Of Sexual Harassment: Liability of the Employer” (2006) 
Obiter 2 253. 
72
  4 of 2000. 
73
   66 of 1995. 
74
   55 of 1998. 
75
   4 of 2000. 
76
  Mukheibir & Ristow “An Overview Of Sexual Harassment: Liability of the Employer” (2006) 
Obiter 253. 
77
   55 of 1998. 
 12 
as opposed to formal equality”, are most significant.78  Sex is listed as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination and it is now well established that, despite early resistance 
in foreign jurisdictions, sexual harassment constitutes a form of discrimination.79 
 
2.3 THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 55 OF 1998 
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 55 OF 1998 
 
A discussion of the Employment Equity Act (hereinafter “the EEA”)80 with specific 
regard to statutory liability for discrimination in the form of sexual harassment will be 
dealt with.  Firstly, a brief introduction and aim of the EEA81 will be provided, followed 
by the relevant provision dealing with the liability of the employer.  Thereafter, the 
author shall deal with the issue of sex as discrimination and its regulation in terms of 
the said Act.  Secondly, application of the Act in case law will also be critically 
evaluated.  The most relevant cases which shall be dealt in detail include: Nstabo v 
Real Security,82 SATTAWU obo Finca v Old Mutual Insurance Limited83 and 
Mokoena v Garden Art (Pty) Ltd.84 
 
The EEA85 endeavours to give effect to the fundamental right to equality in the 
workplace by promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through 
the elimination of unfair discrimination and the implementation of affirmative action 
measures to redress the imbalances of the past.86  The EEA aims to regulate the 
relationship between employers and employees on maters relating to “discrimination 
and affirmative action measures”.87  Chapter 2 of the EEA88 states that “no person 
may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee in any 
employment policy or practice”.  Section 5 states that “every employer must take 
steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by eliminating unfair 
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discrimination in any employment policy or practice”.89  Therefore, once it has been 
established that harassment on any of the prohibited ground has taken place, it is 
unfair and cannot be justified in terms of any general limitation clause.90  It can 
therefore be argued that the constitutional jurisprudence on “unfair discrimination” 
cannot be strictly applied.91  
 
However, it must be remembered that the unfair discrimination provision has been 
shifted to the EEA92 in an amended form and has been released from the ambit of 
the unfair labour practice.93  One can therefore argue for an interpretation of fairness 
which is unequivocally located within the Constitutional Court‟s equality jurisprudence 
with its focus on the impact of discrimination on the complainant and the violation of 
dignity.94  Mukheibir and Ristow95 argue that “one need to ascertain which 
perpetrators of harassment the Act seeks to regulate as section 6(3) is silent.” 
 
2.3.2 LIABILITY IN TERMS OF SECTION 60 OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY 
ACT 55 OF 1998 
 
One of the most important issues in sexual harassment cases is the issue of liability. 
Liability in the context of an employment relationship is where “the employer can be 
held responsible or accountable for the unlawful acts of an employee”.96  In many 
instances the complainant will want to take action against his or her employer as the 
employer will generally have greater means and is the only one that would be able to 
introduce effective measures to eradicate sexual harassment in the workplace.97 
 
Section 60 of the Employment Equity Act98 regulates the employer‟s liability where 
section 60 reads as follows: 
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“(1) If it is alleged that an employee, while at work, contravened a provision of 
this Act, or engaged in any conduct that, if engaged in by that employee‟s 
employer, would constitute a contravention of a provision of this Act, the 
alleged conduct must immediately be brought to the attention of the 
employer. 
 
(2) The employer must consult all relevant parties and must take the necessary 
steps to eliminate the alleged conduct and comply with the provisions of the 
Act. 
 
(3) If the employer fails to take the necessary steps referred to in subsection 
(2), and it is proved that the employee has contravened the relevant 
provision, the employer must be deemed also to have contravened the 
provision. 
 
(4) Despite subsection (3), an employer is not liable for the conduct of an 
employee if that employer is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably 
practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in contravention of 
this Act.” 
 
The purpose of section 60 is to penalise the employer for failing to address equity in 
the workplace and it is not intended to remedy harm done in the delictual sense.99  It 
is accordingly submitted that section 60 ought to be appropriately regarded as a form 
of direct liability than as a form of statutory vicarious liability.100  According to Calitz101 
section 60 of the EEA102 is often seen as “creating a kind of vicarious liability in terms 
of which the employer can be held liable for discrimination against his employee by a 
co-employee”.  Before any liability will be imputed on the employer for any harassing 
conduct of an employee, one needs to consider the responsibilities placed on the 
employer and the employee-victim of harassment by section 60.103  It is submitted 
that this approach is the correct one as it focuses on “preventative measures and 
education in order to create a workplace that is free of discrimination rather than on 
simply punishing the employer for the prohibited conduct of its employees”.104  
However Le Roux and others105 maintain that this section in fact creates direct 
liability for the employer if he fails to take certain steps.  
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Basson106 submits that section 60 of the Employment Equity Act107 gives the 
impression that it was written on the basis of “some degree of estrangement between 
an employer and the discriminating employee in the workplace, an impression 
illustrated by the general requirement that liability will only follow if the employer first 
knows about the conduct and then does nothing”.  A number of cases have applied 
section 60 of the EEA108 as will be discussed below.   
 
2.4 NTSABO v REAL SECURITY CC109 
 
Ntsabo v Real Security is a very significant case explaining the development of law 
relating to employer liability for sexual harassment and the manner in which the 
courts applied section 60 of the EEA.110  
 
The facts of the case are as follows:  the applicant, Bongiwe (Beauty) Ntsabo, who 
was born in 1970, was employed in September by the respondent, Real Security CC 
as a security guard.  For the greater part of her employment she was stationed at the 
Khayelitsha Day Hospital in Cape Town, where she generally worked a twelve-hour 
shift.  She continued in this position up until 19 January 2000 when she resigned, 
and she earned approximately R1000 per month at the time of her resignation. 
 
Once she had resigned from her job, the applicant decided to take her grievance to 
court.  The essence of her allegations was that from the beginning of December 1999 
Mr Dlomo, (who served as her immediate supervisor), had regularly harassed her 
sexually and that he even eventually assaulted her.  Ms Ntsabo testified that on 
different occasions Mr Dlomo “had touched her breasts, thighs, buttocks and 
genitals”.  The final insult occurred when her supervisor “simulated a sexual act on 
her, resulting in him ejaculating on her skirt”.  Mr Dlomo also made sexual proposals 
to her.  Owing to the continued harassment the applicant stated that she had become 
“very uneasy” in her work environment.  In an attempt to remedy the matter, she 
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informed one Mrs Fisher of the alleged harassment.  Mrs Fisher was a manager in 
the employ of the respondent.  Furthermore, she alleged that she and her brother, Mr 
Ntsabo, had informed the respondent of the continued unwanted actions of Mr 
Dlomo.  Her brother had also laid a complaint at the head office about the alleged 
incident involving simulated sexual intercourse. 
 
Ms Ntsabo alleged that the respondent had done nothing to alleviate the problem, 
and that she had been unable to continue working in such intolerable conditions 
prompting her to resign.  The applicant also alleged that her original letter of 
resignation had been destroyed by Mrs Fisher and that a second letter of resignation 
which Mrs Fisher had dictated to her was accepted on file.  The original letter held 
that the sexual harassment was the reason for her resignation.  The second letter 
made no reference to harassment, but only referred to the applicant‟s personal 
circumstances, mentioning the poor health of her mother.  Real Security CC denied 
that any harassment had occurred, and stated that if such harassment had taken 
place, it had not been reported to the employer in accordance with the required 
reporting procedure as set out by the EEA.111 
 
After an evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties the court held that the 
respondent failed to convince the court with the truthfulness of their witnesses.  The 
court observed that Mr Dlomo was an “untruthful, argumentative and disagreeable 
witness who contradicted himself on a number of occasions and even lied to the 
court”.112  Conversely, the testimony of the applicant was “clear and concise,” and 
she satisfied the court with her account of events.113  The court concluded that, 
based on the applicant‟s testimony, sexual harassment had occurred.114  The 
respondent further argued that Ms Ntsabo had failed to report the incident of 
harassment in the prompt manner set out in section 60 of the EEA.  The Court 
refuted this argument stating that prompt reporting does not always mean 
“immediate” reporting.  In addition the court held that the individual circumstances 
had to be examined in each case, including the “cultural backgrounds of the people 
involved” and stated: 
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“The requirement that the reporting procedure be reported immediately cannot be 
construed to mean within minutes of the incident complained of.  There are 
circumstances of which one is reminded in such considerations.  It is trite that 
such a requirement is regarded as being complied with when it has been done 
within a reasonable time in the circumstances.  That it has been done in 
„reasonable time‟ will of course from case to case and [be] determined by the 
relevant circumstances which prevail.  It must also be remembered that this 
requirement is underpinned by the notion of giving the recipient of the notice and 
opportunity to deal with the complaint without any prejudice.  To expect her to 
have dropped everything in the condition she was in is an unreasonable 
expectation.”
115 
 
After taking all the relevant circumstances and evidence into account the court issued 
the following order: firstly, the applicant‟s dismissal was found “to be unfair” (in terms 
of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995) and the respondent was ordered to 
compensate the applicant R12 000 which is the maximum amount prescribed for the 
unfair dismissal.  Secondly, the respondent was ordered in terms of the Employment 
Equity Act 55 of 1998, to pay damages to the applicant for 
 
(i) future medical costs (R20 000); and 
(ii) general damages including contumelia (an amount of R50 000). 
 
In addition, the respondent was ordered to pay costs of application.  
 
In addition, claims were sought in alternative firstly, unfair dismissal in terms of the 
LRA. Secondly, Ms Ntsabo claimed “patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages” in 
terms of the EEA.  The author shall discuss these claims separately in that respect. 
 
(a) Unfair Dismissal in Terms of the LRA116 
 
The significance of unfair dismissal will be discussed as applied by the courts.  The 
court applied section 186(1)(e) of the LRA117 and stated that the conduct referred to 
in this section  does not “specifically refer to proactive conduct by the employer and 
                                                 
115
  Ntsabo 2374B-G. 
116
  66 of 1995. 
117
  Ibid. 
 18 
further that a failure to deal with an intolerable situation is just as much contemplated 
in section 186(1)(e) of the LRA”.118 
 
In arriving at the decision to award compensation for unfair dismissal the court took 
into account the fact that the applicant informed the respondent of the initial sexual 
harassment by Mr Dlomo in early December 1999.  By the time she had resigned 
matters had worsened and the incident on 15 December 1999 had not been 
addressed by the employer to normalise the situation and ensure that “the risk to the 
applicant was neutralised”.  The court also stated that the reluctance to deal with the 
complaints impacted negatively on Ms Ntsabo that “not only were there patent effects 
but this was compounded by her feeling that her credibility and integrity was being 
undermined”.  Moreover, the court maintained that the inaction of the respondent was 
unfair and led to a situation that became an intolerable environment for the applicant 
to continue discharging her duties.  The court submitted that the respondent did, or 
ought to have foreseen the development of a hostile and intolerable environment in 
the circumstances. In his defence the respondent averred that it “was not informed of 
the harassment” and for that reason there was no proof that dismissal was fair.  The 
court asserted that “the dismissal conformed to the situations envisaged in section 
186(1)(e) of the LRA”.119 
 
(b)  Patrimonial and Non-Patrimonial Damages in Terms of the EEA 
 
The court also took into account the awarding of patrimonial and non-patrimonial 
damages which will be alluded to below.  Smit et al120 are of the opinion that the 
respondent had no procedures in place in Real Security on how to deal with sexual 
harassment problems.  This was the case regardless of the existence of the Code of 
Good Practice containing several detailed recommendations in this regard.121  The 
court, however, held that as the provisions of the Code were merely instructive 
guidelines as “the respondent could not be penalised for its failure to implement the 
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Code‟s recommendations”.122  The Labour Court can invoke section 50(2) of the 
EEA123 which provides for “the awarding of compensation as well as damages for 
conduct constituting unfair discrimination”.  The claims of the applicant included: 
firstly, contumelia and secondly, pain and suffering, emotional or psychological 
trauma, shock and loss of amenities of life.  It was the view of the court that “because 
the claims stem from the same incident, aside from the obvious dilemma of how to 
apportion the ultimate award, it is in [the judge‟s] view convenient and safer to make 
one award in respect of those two headings”.  The court also alluded to the fact that 
“the spirit of the EEA places an obligatory duty on all employers to protect its 
employees against offensive conduct and that failure to do so is a disregard for the 
law.” In addition, the judge conceded that even though he had attempted to be fair to 
both parties, “the ever present feelings of repugnance at the conduct of Mr Dlomo 
and the support he received from the respondent over a relatively lengthy period 
leaves a bitter taste”.  Consequently, the judge was rightly compelled to add “punitive 
measures in the form of financial compensation into the equation – particularly 
considering the impact the harassment and the failure of the employer to act as a 
result had on the applicant‟s rights”.124 
 
It is further submitted that there is “no minimum damage, such as post traumatic 
stress syndrome, that needs to be suffered before an employer before the employer 
will be liable”.125  The issue is simply whether sexual harassment has taken place.126 
 
2.5 LIABILITY IN TERMS OF SECTION 6 OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 
 
In this part of the discussion the author will firstly look at discrimination in terms of the 
section 6 which deals with unfair discrimination and sexual harassment as a form of 
unfair discrimination.  Further down, the test for discrimination will be analysed with 
specific reference to the case of Harksen v Lane.  Thereafter, is a proposed way on 
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how the test for discrimination can best be tailored to suit the context of sexual 
harassment.  
 
The EEA127 endeavors to give effect to the “fundamental right to equality in the 
workplace by promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through 
the elimination of unfair discrimination and the implementation of affirmative action 
measures to redress the imbalances of the past”. 
 
The focus of this part of the discussion is on unfair discrimination in the workplace; 
the test for unfair discrimination and the manner the courts have applied section 6 of 
the EEA in different cases. 
 
While discrimination (in this case sexual harassment) is dealt with primarily in the 
EEA and PEPUDA,128 Mukheibir and Ristow129 argue that these statutes “must be 
interpreted in light of the Constitutional right to equality and the Constitutional Court‟s 
approach to the application of this right”.  Section 9(3) of the Constitution130 contains 
an express prohibition on unfair discrimination and section 10 records that “every 
person shall have the right to respect for and protection of his or her dignity”. 
 
The cornerstone of the prohibition of unfair discrimination in South African 
workplaces is found in section 6(1); (3) of the EEA131 which reads as follows: 
 
“(1)  No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an 
employee, in any employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, 
including (amongst others) race, gender, and sex. 
 
(3) Harassment of an employee is a form of unfair discrimination and is 
prohibited on any one, or a combination of grounds of unfair discrimination 
listed in subsection (1).” 
 
Section 6(3) of the EEA132 has been described by Basson133 as “a clear message 
from the legislature about the importance of a link between harassment and 
                                                 
127
  S 2 of the EEA 55 of 1998. 
128
  4 of 2000. 
129
  Mukheibir & Ristow “An Overview of Sexual Harassment: Liability of the Employer” (2006) Obiter 
245 253. 
130
  108 of 1996. 
131
  55 of 1998. 
132
  55 of 1998. 
 21 
discrimination”.  The Labour Courts have adopted the Constitutional Court‟s method 
of establishing whether an employee was unfairly discriminated against, 
notwithstanding the fact that section 6 of the EEA134 is not completely consistent with 
section 9 of the Constitution135 which favours “substantive equality that examines the 
impact on the victim, rather than assessing the conduct or intent of the 
perpetrator”.136 
 
2.5.1 THE TEST FOR UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 
 
The test for unfair discrimination was laid down by the Constitutional Court in 
Harksen v Lane NO137 and consists of three questions namely: 
 
 Does the conduct amount to differentiation and does it amount to 
discrimination? 
 
 Is the discrimination unfair? 
 
 If yes, can the discrimination be justified? 
 
Differentiation will amount to discrimination if “it violates the right to dignity of 
persons” and also when it “bears on the attributes or characteristics of persons in 
question”.138  Discrimination that is not one of the listed grounds in the Constitution139 
will be tested for unfairness by focusing on the impact of the discrimination on the 
complainant and other in his or her position.  Fault on the part of the employer is not 
a requirement in an unfair discrimination claim, as it is sufficient that the 
differentiation can be linked to a ground of discrimination, irrespective of the 
underlying reason for that differentiation.140  Garbers141submits that “the concept of 
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harassment as discrimination will be contradictory as long as the test for harassment 
is determined by the application of fault”.142  Therefore, “the extent of the impairment 
of the fundamental dignity of the complainant will be significant.143 
 
Despite widespread acceptance of the link between harassment and discrimination 
Basson144 contends that 
 
“problems still remain due to fundamental differences that exist between 
discrimination and harassment as legal phenomena: a claim for sex 
discrimination (particularly direct discrimination) requires the claimant to show 
that there was differential treatment on the basis of sex”. 
  
Once a claimant is able to show the causal link between differential treatment and 
her sex, discrimination on the basis of sex will have been established.145  
Furthermore, Basson146 maintains that this formula is not feasible in sexual 
harassment particularly in those cases where the victim of sexual harassment is in 
fact able to show “differential treatment on the basis of sex”.  She attributes this to 
the fact that victims of sexual harassment must, in addition to establishing a certain 
kind of conduct (the differential treatment for purposes of discrimination), also show 
that conduct was of a certain degree.147  Moreover, she is of the view that 
“establishing a differential treatment as a precondition for a finding of sex as 
discrimination is always possible in cases of harassment”.148 
 
According to Garbers:149 
 
“This search for a comparator has caused endless problems in the field of 
discrimination law – also in the context of harassment.  To some extent, this 
problem has been solved by simply recognising that sexual harassment (or for 
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that matter, sexual attention) is inherently sex based (like pregnancy), and in that 
way, stands to equal sex discrimination.  Still, and even given this insight, 
fundamental problems remain, problems that have shown themselves to be of 
practical import.  To name four: same-sex harassment, the „obnoxious employee‟ 
(who treats both sexes equally badly), sexual favouritism, and sexual orientation 
harassment.  They serve as constant reminders of the fallibility of the dogma that 
sexual harassment equals sex discrimination.” 
 
The test established in Harksen v Lane NO150 will not be applied in the same manner 
in as far as harassment is concerned because the wording of the EEA151 suggests a 
slightly different approach.152  Section 6(3) of the EEA153 explicitly states that 
harassment constitutes unfair discrimination.  Once the existence of the harassment 
on one or more of the grounds listed in section 6(1) is established, it is unfair and 
cannot be justified.154  In this regard it is the “employers‟ prerogative to prevent 
sexual harassment from occurring in the first place”.155 
 
2.5.2 APPROPRIATE TEST FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
Sexual harassment is established in circumstances which are different from general 
discrimination.  In the author‟s view the formulation of an appropriate test for sexual 
harassment is imperative.  In that regard this paragraph will detail a recommended 
test for sexual harassment and a further alternative test to establish sexual 
harassment. 
 
Cooper156 recommends that a more appropriate test would be one which takes into 
consideration the provision of the Act that “harassment is a form of unfair 
discrimination” and is “located within the constitutional equality jurisprudence where 
the focus is more centrally on the effect of the conduct on the individual”.  He also 
adds that “standards of reasonableness should not be based on delictual notions of 
negligence, but on an objective weighing up of all relevant factors for a finding of 
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whether the harassing conduct amounts to a violation of the dignity of the person and 
therefore constitutes a form of unfair discrimination”.157 
 
The following elements for testing sexual harassment as a form of unfair 
discrimination have been proposed by Cooper:158 
 
 whether the harassment is on a prohibited ground or grounds; 
 
 whether the recipient has indicated that the conduct is unwelcome; 
 
 the nature and extent of the conduct; 
 
 the impact of the conduct on the individual and whether it amounts to an 
invasion of the individual‟s rights and interests and to an impairment of dignity. 
 
After taking all factors into account, the court has to determine whether the conduct 
amounts to a form of unfair discrimination.159  The overall test will be whether the 
conduct “violates the dignity of the individual, in line with the foregrounding of dignity 
as fundamental to the achievement of equality in constitutional jurisprudence, and 
constitute a barrier to equality in the workplace”.160 
 
2.5.3 AN ALTERNATIVE TEST FOR UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT 
 
A different test for establishing unfair discrimination in sexual harassment is found in 
the PEPUDA.161  This Act regulates social relationships in the workplace and covers 
everyone including those excluded by the EEA.162  Unlike the EEA,163 the 
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PEPUDA164 provides for a detailed definition of sexual harassment and it does not 
locate harassment within the ambit of unfair discrimination. 
 
Harassment is defined as  
 
“Unwanted conduct which is persistent or serious and demeans, humiliates or 
creates a hostile or intimidating environment or is calculated to induce 
submission by actual or threatened adverse consequences and which is related 
to (a) sex, gender or sexual orientation; or (b) a person‟s membership or 
presumed membership of a group identified by one or more of the prohibited 
grounds.” 
 
The victim has to indicate that the conduct is “unwelcome and the test would in this 
regard require the conduct to be persistent or a serious single incident and this is an 
objective test”.165  The requirement that the conduct should “demean, humiliate or 
lead to a hostile or intimidating environment, or induce submission by actual or 
threatened adverse consequences, constitutes two elements, firstly, it focuses on the 
impact of the conduct on the individual and, secondly, it set standards which the 
conduct must comply with in order to be considered sexual harassment”.166  This 
provision is “flexible and inclusive as it is adequate conduct to constitute or amount to 
sexual harassment where he conduct is demeaning or humiliating”.167  Sexual 
harassment will not result where the conduct falls short in meeting one of the 
standards.  Cooper168 applauds this test for its “clarity and logic”, and also that it 
focuses on the impact of one individual; that it could be reconciled with the 
requirements of the EEA.169 
 
Once sexual harassment has been established, it is unfair and cannot be justified in 
terms of any general limitations clause.  It is, therefore, submitted that constitutional 
jurisprudence on unfair discrimination cannot be strictly applied.170  Cooper171 
                                                 
164
  4 of 2000. 
165
  Cooper “Harassment on the Basis of Sex and Gender: A form of Unfair Discrimination” (2002) 
23 ILJ 29 36. 
166
  Supra. 
167
  Cooper (2002) 23 ILJ 29 36. 
168
  Cooper (2002) 23 ILJ 29 31. 
169
   55 of 1998. 
170
  Mukheibir & Ristow “An Overview of Sexual Harassment: Liability of the Employer” (2006) Obiter 
245 253. 
171
  Cooper “Harassment on the Basis of Sex and Gender: A form of Unfair Discrimination” (2002) 
23 ILJ 31. 
 26 
submits that sexual harassment is discrimination on the basis of sex in that, “a 
person‟s biological sex may determine his or her selection as the target of the 
harassment” and it is also discrimination on the grounds of gender in that, “socially 
constructed perceptions of the roles of the respective sexes can form a basis for the 
discriminatory conduct”.  According to Mukheibir and Ristow,172 because the unfair 
discrimination provision has been shifted to the EEA173 in an amended form and has 
been released from the ambit of labour practice, it is proper, therefore, to argue for 
“an interpretation of fairness which is unequivocally located within the Constitutional 
Court‟s equality jurisprudence with its focus on the impact of discrimination on the 
complainant and the violation of dignity”.174 
 
Finally, it may be conceded by Cooper175 that the first test discussed above is not 
entirely different from the present one, except for the level of the severity of conduct 
required for harassment.  It is argued that using both tests, under the Equality Act176 
and in terms of the EEA177 would be advantageous in “creating consistency in what is 
quite a difficult and contested area of law”.178 
 
2.6 SATAWU OBO FINCA v OLD MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (SA) 
LIMITED AND BURGER179 
 
This case deals with a matter of racial discrimination as shall be discussed below. 
The case of SATAWU obo Finca v Old Mutual Life Insurance Company, although not 
dealing with a matter of sexual harassment, is significant because the manner it 
applies section 60 of the EEA180 regarding liability of the employer and serves as a 
relevant comparison.  
 
The facts SATAWU are as follows: during April 2003 an employee (Burger) of Old 
Mutual made a complaint to her immediate superior about being placed in close 
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proximity to black employees in the office.  Finca was one of these black employees.  
There was some dispute about the words actually uttered by Burger, but Revelas J 
was satisfied that they included the “k-word”.  The remark was overheard by another 
colleague (Jeffries) and she confronted Burger‟s superior (Van Zyl).181  At this stage 
Finca was unaware of the remark.  Van Zyl did two things: First, she tried to 
downplay the significance of the remark by claiming that Afrikaans-speaking people 
do not necessarily use this word in a derogatory sense, and second, clearly sensing 
that trouble was looming, apparently warned Burger verbally, although the exact 
nature of the warning, if it was in fact issued, remains vague.  Jeffries was not 
satisfied that the matter had been dealt with correctly and decided to tell Finca about 
the remark to involve the union.182  The Union recommended that Old Mutual should 
investigate Van Zyl‟s actions in view of the fact that she was aware that in its 
disciplinary code the offence was regarded as serious misconduct that may lead to 
dismissal, and that it should have been subject to a formal disciplinary inquiry.  
Merely issuing a warning was not the appropriate action, or so the union claimed.183 
 
Further investigation of the facts revealed that despite this request by the union and a 
later grievance lodged by Finca, Old Mutual declined to take any further action.  Only 
after the employment equity manager and the transformation manager intervened did 
a disciplinary inquiry ensue.  The enquiry took place during October and November 
2003, six months after the offending remark was uttered.  
 
After assessing all the evidence the court found Burger guilty of the use of racist 
language and the chairperson of the disciplinary inquiry, finding that the initial 
warning was vague, recommended dismissal.184  In his decision the chairperson 
relied upon a judgment of the labour appeal court in Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd v 
Kapp and others185 where the labour appeal court stated clearly that “in the context of 
employment disputes, it (and the LC) will deal with acts of racism “very firmly” and 
that such an approach will contribute to the fight for the elimination of racism in the 
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workplace”.  Burger appealed against her dismissal.  The appeal was heard by 
Williamson, one of the most senior persons in Old Mutual.  Williamson reinstated 
Burger while condemning her conduct and the manner in which Van Zyl and others 
had handled the issue.  He contended that the initial warning was not vague; the 
length of time which had elapsed before the disciplinary enquiry commenced created 
the impression that the matter had been finalized; thus Old Mutual had been 
estopped from proceeding with a disciplinary inquiry.186  Van Zyl J thus found that the 
disciplinary hearing should have been upheld.187 
 
After the outcome of the appeal, the union approached the Labour Court for 
declarations to the effect that the conduct of Burger and Old Mutual amounted to 
discrimination; an order setting aside the findings of Williamson; an order for 
compensation for Finca and a Labour Court directive on steps to be taken to avoid 
similar conduct in future.  Revelas J observed that discrimination had taken place on 
the part of Burger and Old Mutual and made a compensation order by the employer 
to Finca, however she upheld Williamson‟s decision and declined to issue a Labour 
Court directive.188  
 
2.6.1 LIABILITY OF OLD MUTUAL FOR BURGER’S REMARK 
 
Revelas J in the Old Mutual case concluded that the remark was “clearly racist in 
nature” and that “Old Mutual‟s delay in taking action against Burger and its failure to 
protect Finca amounted to direct discrimination in terms of section 6(1) of the 
EEA”.189  The usual test for discrimination, namely establishing whether the conduct 
amounted to differentiation on a prohibited ground, was not applied.  The court 
simply accepted that in delaying taking appropriate measures after the racist remark 
had been made about the employee by a co-employee, Old Mutual itself 
discriminated against the employee.  Old Mutual was not held liable on the basis of 
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“statutory vicarious liability” in terms of section 60 of the Employment Equity Act190 for 
unclear reasons, but was held directly liable in terms of section 6.  In interpreting this 
decision Calitz191 observed that “mere inaction of the employer to act on a complaint 
about discriminatory conduct thus amounted to discrimination by the employer itself”.  
Although the judge did not specifically deal with section 60 of the EEA, Le Roux192 
submits that “the judge‟s finding is a correct application of section 60(1) - (3) of the 
EEA”. 
 
If section 60(1) - (3) was applied to the facts of this case Old Mutual failed to consult 
with all relevant parties and to address Burger‟s conduct which was brought to its 
attention by Jeffries immediately after the remark was uttered and Old Mutual should 
in that light be held liable.  In addition, the conduct of Burger contravened section 
(6)1 of the EEA193 and could initiate the application of section 60.194  This, however, 
was not considered in the judgment.  If an expansive meaning of harassment is 
observed (considering South Africa‟s history of racial oppression, this is likely), it is 
conceivable that that Burger‟s conduct, in the sense that it created a hostile 
environment (evidenced by Jeffries‟ reaction) could be regarded as harassment.  
This would constitute a contravention of section 6 (3) of the EEA and would trigger 
the application of section 60.195 
 
Regarding subsection 4 Revelas J in SATAWU v Old Mutual Life Insurance 
Company held that: 
 
“The first respondent led undisputed evidence that it has done much by way of 
training and other means, to eradicate racism …  The undisputed evidence was 
that there was no lack of training in this particular area of human relationships 
within the first respondent.  It is the response to such training, which was the 
problem in this matter.  Some mindsets will not respond to training.  Swift 
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disciplinary action and damages or compensation as punitive measures, should 
be imposed when training has failed.”
196
 
 
Commenting on the above Le Roux197 was of the view that the Old Mutual had “done 
everything that it could to ensure that its employees did not misbehave in this 
regard”.  The judge‟s refusal to make an order in respect of the applicant‟s prayer 
requesting a Labour Court directive on steps to be taken by Old Mutual to avoid 
similar conduct in future fortifies this conclusion.198  Le Roux199 also contended that 
Burger‟s conduct was the result of her mindset and not the failure of the employer to 
do all that reasonably practicable to ensure that employees would not act in 
contravention of the Employment Equity Act.200 
 
Furthermore, it was clear that the employer had failed to respond to Burger‟s conduct 
(in the manner contemplated by subsection 2), the question should have been 
whether all reasonable practicable steps to prevent discrimination by their employees 
had been taken by the employer.201  The judgment‟s failure to apply the statutory 
provisions and to provide clear guidelines on the meaning of “all reasonably 
practicable steps” is frustrating.  The Old Mutual case is a timeous reminder to 
employers that racism and other discriminatory conduct in the workplace require 
immediate and strong disciplinary action by the employer.202 
 
Section 60 of the EEA,203 and more specifically employer liability for discrimination by 
its employees, is not as sweeping as it might appear at first glance.  The liability 
envisaged by it will only arise if a contravention of a provision of the EEA can be 
established.  Isolated conduct by a recalcitrant employee, unless it can be said to be 
harassment and thus a contravention of section 6(3) of the EEA,204 will fall foul of the 
requirement in section 6(1) that “discrimination must be in an employment policy or 
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practice”.205  Although the racist remark itself cannot be seen as an “employment 
policy or practice” in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA,206 Old Mutual‟s failure to act 
can be seen as indicative of a policy or practice. It was for this conduct that Old 
Mutual was held directly liable.207 
 
2.7 STEPS THE EMPLOYER MAY TAKE TO AVOID LIABILITY 
 
The employer may take steps in order to escape liability.  Section 60 of the 
Employment Equity Act208 states the following: 
 
“The employer must consult all relevant parties and must take the necessary 
steps to eliminate the alleged conduct and comply with the provisions of this Act.” 
 
The employer is, therefore, afforded the opportunity to address the problem, thereby 
escaping liability.  In addition, to determine the necessary steps to be taken by the 
employer, the employer should consult its sexual harassment policy or, if there is no 
existing policy, should be guided by the Code of Good Practice on the Handling of 
Sexual Harassment Cases.209 
 
Section 60(3) of the Employment Equity Act210 records that: 
 
“If the employer fails to take the necessary steps referred to in subsection (2), 
and it is proved that the employee has contravened the relevant provision, the 
employer must be deemed also to have contravened that provision.” 
 
In the Ntsabo case the court imputed liability on the employer for failure to address 
the complaint which had been lodged by the complainant for six weeks after being 
informed and turned a blind eye.  He was in that regard found liable in terms of 
section 60(3). 
 
Section 60(4) states that: 
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“Despite subsection (3), an employer is not liable for the conduct of an employee 
if that employer is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to 
ensure that the employee would not act in contravention of this Act.” 
 
The subsection should be understood as absolving the employers from liability when 
they have put measures in place to ensure that harassment does not occur.  The 
measures contemplated include the implementation of a sexual harassment policy, 
as well as appropriate information sharing and training which seek to combat 
harassment in the workplace.  The general notion of any defence against a claim in 
terms of section 60 must take account of the fact the EEA211 aims to encourage 
employers to remove obstacles to equality in the workplace.212 
 
In light of the Ntsabo case it is evident that the employer did not have any policies 
and structures in place to address harassment and thus fell outside the legal 
protection provided for in section 60(4) of the EEA.213  Employees should be made 
aware of the educational policies instituted by the employer and channels to follow in 
the event of harassment arising. In addition employees should contribute in the 
setting up of mechanisms and programmes of combating sexual harassment. 
 
2.8 MOKOENA v GARDEN ART (PTY) LTD214 
 
Another case which attempts to address the liability of the employer in terms of the 
EEA215 is that of Mokoena v Garden Art (Pty) Ltd.  Firstly, a summary of the facts of 
the case will be given followed by the judgment. 
 
According to the facts, two women, Mokoena and Mokhethi, instituted a claim against 
their employer, Garden Art (Pty) Ltd, in terms of section 60 of the EEA.216  They 
alleged that they had been harassed by their supervisor, Mohlabane, and that the 
failure of employer to take steps to prevent, eliminate or prohibit “sexism” and 
“genderism” being perpetrated at the workplace constituted direct unfair 
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discrimination.  The two women each claimed R100 000 damages from their 
employer.  The employer opposed the claim on the ground that sexual harassment 
had not been established from the steps it had taken steps to investigate the 
complaints. 
 
Furthermore, Mokoena alleged that Mohlabane had sexually harassed her when he 
walked into the female change-room without knocking while she was changing and 
stood and stared at her while she was in panties and a T-shirt.217  This was the only 
incident about which she complained. Mokoena reported the incident to her employer 
three months later and lodged a grievance.218  The grievance was formally dealt with 
by the employer.  Mohlabane was found guilty of invasion of privacy but not guilty of 
sexual harassment due to lack of evidence.  Mohlabane was warned to stay away 
from the female change-rooms.219 
 
Mokhethi alleged that while she was collecting her wages from Mohlabane he 
“grabbed her buttocks and breasts and smiled”.220  Mokhethi did not report this 
incident to management.221  Another incident followed a few months later where 
Mohlabane “fondled her” in his office and “followed her to the change-rooms”.222  
When she was naked he told her not to report the incident to anyone.223  She 
reported the incident to the employer the next day and a hearing was convened.  As 
there were no eyewitnesses to corroborate Mokhethi‟s version, the employer found 
Mohlabane not guilty of sexual harassment.  After considering section 60 of the 
EEA,224 the Labour Court set out seven requirements that must be complied with in 
order for an employer to be held liable for sexual harassment namely: 
 
 The conduct must be committed by an employee of the employer. 
 
 The conduct must constitute sexual harassment. 
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 The sexual harassment must take place at the workplace. 
 
 The sexual harassment must immediately be brought to the attention of the 
employer. 
 
 The employer must be aware of the sexual harassment. 
 
 The employer must have failed to consult the necessary parties or to take the 
necessary steps to eliminate the sexual harassment or otherwise comply with 
the EEA. 
 
 The employer must show that it took all reasonable practical steps to ensure 
that the employee would not act in contravention of the EEA.225 
 
In light of the above requirements the Labour Court made the following findings: an 
employer will not escape liability in terms of section 60 of the EEA226 in instances 
where sexual harassment is immediately brought to the attention of the employer; the 
employer is aware of the sexual harassment and fails to take steps to eliminate it and 
a further act of sexual harassment has taken place.  An employer cannot be held 
liable in terms of s60 of the EEA227 for an act of sexual harassment, where there is 
only one incident of sexual harassment, which is immediately reported to the 
employer.  The term “immediately” has been interpreted by the courts to literally to 
mean “without delay” as well as to mean “as soon as is reasonably possible”, 
depending on the context.228  Cooper229 proposes that a more flexible standard of “as 
soon as is reasonably possible” should be adopted to cater for situations were there 
is no sexual harassment policy and where the victim is a junior employee, the 
perpetrator is the supervisor.  Furthermore, the need for swift action and justice to the 
                                                 
225
   Dupper et al Essential Employment Disrcimination Law (2004) 40. 
226
   55 of 1998. 
227
   Supra. 
228
   The different meanings of the word were examined in Msongelwa v Zinc Corporation of SA 
(1993) 14 ILJ (T) 917. 
229
   Cooper “Harassment on the Basis of Sex and Gender: A form of Unfair Discrimination” (2002) 
23 ILJ 40. 
 35 
employer who might be deemed liable must be weighed up against the sensitiveness 
of the employee in the particular case.230  
 
With respect to liability in terms of s60 of the EEA, the Labour Court observed that 
 
“Section 60 of the EEA really applies where it has been brought to the attention 
of the employer that sexual harassment has taken place, as a result of the 
employer‟s inaction, a further incident of sexual harassment takes place, which 
renders the employer liable.” 
 
After applying the seven criteria to the facts of the case, the Labour Court concluded 
as follows: 
 
 The act complained of by Mokoena was not sexual harassment.  The Court 
found Mokoena to be an unreliable witness who contradicted herself.231 
 
 The incident of Mohlabane fondling Mokhethi in his office and following her to 
the change-room was sexual harassment. 
 
 The incident of sexual harassment was immediately brought to the employer‟s 
attention. 
 
 The employer did consult with the employees concerned and took steps to 
prevent Mohlabane‟s conduct taking place again. 
 
 The employer took reasonable practical steps to ensure that Mohlabane would 
not act in contravention of the EEA.232 
 
The court in this respect confirmed the grievance hearing after Mokhethi had 
reported the incident as both reasonable and sufficient to prevent future acts of 
sexual harassment.  Furthermore, the Court stated that the claim would have 
succeeded had the employer not taken steps once it had been alerted to prevent 
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further sexual harassment taking place.  The claim for damages was accordingly 
dismissed. 
 
From the foregoing judgment it may be submitted that an employer will not be held 
liable in terms in terms of section 60 of the EEA where an employee commits only 
one act of sexual harassment.  According to Venter233 liability in terms of section 60 
of the EEA234 will only be imposed where a further act of sexual harassment takes 
place as a result of the employer‟s failure to deal with and take steps to prevent such 
an act recurring.  Moreover, the nature of the reasonable steps would depend largely 
upon the circumstances of the as well as the seriousness of the allegations of sexual 
harassment.235 
 
In his view of the judgment Venter236 suggests that a grievance hearing where all 
parties involved are present and put their versions forward, is “a reasonable step by 
an employer in preventing sexual harassment from taking place”.  She alludes to the 
fact that “the implementation of a sexual harassment policy in the workplace will be 
the first step by the employer in the prevention and elimination of sexual harassment 
in the workplace”.  The sexual harassment policy should set out the procedures to be 
followed by the victim of harassment in bringing it to the attention of the employer 
and the measures the employer must take to prevent sexual harassment from 
recurring.237 
 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, a successful claim for unfair discrimination against an employer places 
the onus on the employee to show that the conduct complained of was “unwelcome”, 
that the conduct complained of was based on sex (that it was of a sexual nature) and 
that the conduct was serious enough (judged against the nature and extent of the 
conduct) to support a finding of harassment.238 
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CHAPTER THREE 
COMMON LAW DIRECT LIABILITY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO COMMON LAW DIRECT LIABILITY 
 
Direct liability refers to the circumstances under which an employer will be held liable 
for unlawful acts caused by their conduct which leads to harm or injury of the 
employee. In this chapter the author shall firstly, discuss the requirements of a delict 
necessary for direct liability to arise.  Secondly, relevant case law pertaining to the 
elements necessary for a delict to arise will also be analysed. 
 
The nature of direct liability for sexual harassment based on the common law is 
examined in terms of the law of delict.239  The liability will usually arise in terms of the 
employer‟s omission to take positive measures to ensure a harassment free 
environment.240  Before the employer can be held directly liable for damage 
sustained as a result of sexual harassment, it is imperative to establish the following 
elements of delict with regard to the employer: 
 
 The employer committed an act or omission; 
 
 The act or omission was unlawful; 
 
 The act or omission was culpable, intentional or negligent; 
 
 A third party suffered harm; either patrimonial damage or injury to personality; 
and the act or omission caused that harm.241 
 
[T]he problematic element in succeeding with a delictual claim … is the element of 
wrongfulness.242  Although it is not the only requirement, wrongfulness is the primary 
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requirement in the present context aside from negligence, causation and damage.243  
Wrongfulness usually causes problems in cases where the conduct is an omission or 
a statement.244  Liability often arises from an omission, due to the employer‟s failure 
to take precautions, or to respond to complaints made by the victim.245  Mukheibir246 
submits that “due largely to the laissez-faire concept of liberty, individuals are 
generally free to mind their own business, even where they might reasonably be 
expected to avert harm”.  The enquiry into wrongfulness often focuses on whether a 
duty exists, especially in cases where it is not easy to identify a right.  This occurs 
where the defendant is blamed for an omission (failure to prevent harm to another 
person), for causing financial loss by misstatement or unsound advice, or where 
breach of a statutory duty is involved.247  The wrongfulness of an act basically lies 
either in the infringement of a subjective right (which of course includes the 
personality right to physical psychological integrity), or in the breach of a legal duty to 
prevent damage to another.248  In other words, the wrongfulness of an omission is 
decided on the basis of whether the defendant under the circumstances had a legal 
duty to prevent the harm from ensuing.249 
 
3.2 BACKGROUND OF DELICTUAL OMISSIONS 
 
Liability for an omission involves enquiring whether a duty not to cause harm exists. 
The question is whether the harm fell within the defendant‟s scope of responsibility, 
so that we regard failure to prevent the harm as wrongful.250  Liability for an omission 
has a long and interesting history which has continued into the constitutional era.251  
Aquilian liability was essentially limited to culpable conduct in the form of a positive 
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act, causing physical injury to the plaintiff.252  In other words, it was not available for 
harm caused by omission.   
 
The development of liability for an omission is marked by a movement away from 
casuistry, in the form of specific rules like the prior conduct rule, towards a more 
general formulation, namely that liability will ensue where there was a legal duty upon 
the defendant to prevent harm to the plaintiff, and “prior conduct”, although not the 
sole criterion for liability, is one of several factors to which the court will regard in 
establishing liability.253  In Halliwel v Johannesburg Municipal Council254 the court 
held that liability for an omission could not ensue in the absence of prior conduct on 
the part of the defendant.  The “prior conduct” requirement was rejected by Steyn JA 
in a minority decision in Silva‟s Fishing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Maweza255 in favour of 
the preferred view that “prior conduct” was but one of the several considerations 
which might indicate the existence of a legal duty. 
 
3.3 THE TEST FOR WRONGFULNESS 
 
It is trite that the basic criterion for determining wrongfulness is the legal convictions 
of the community (boni mores):256 whether the defendant unreasonably, or contrary 
to the boni mores or the legal convictions of the community, failed to prevent harm to 
the plaintiff.257  To determine whether or not wrongfulness is present in the case of a 
particular omission is not a question about the usual “negligence” of the bonus 
paterfamilias, but rather whether with regard to all the facts there was a legal duty to 
act reasonably.258  The general function is to determine whether the affected interest 
of the plaintiff (judged either on its own or in balance with a conflicting interest of 
defendant) deserves protection from the defendant‟s action or lack of action, so that 
the burden of bearing the loss should be shifted from plaintiff to defendant.259  [I]t is 
important to note that interference with physical-mental integrity through an omission 
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is not prima facie wrongful.260  This conclusion of law depends upon an examination 
of all the circumstances of the particular case, and a weighing up of, and the striking 
of a balance between, the interests of the parties (the victim and the state) and that 
of the community, which entails a proportionality exercise where the interplay of 
various factors has to be considered.261  In Media24 v Grobler262 it was held that “the 
legal convictions of the require an employer to take reasonable steps to prevent 
sexual harassment of its employees in the workplace and to be obliged to 
compensate the victim for harm caused thereby should it negligently fail to do so”. 
 
3.3.1 MINISTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY v VAN DUIVENBODEN263 
 
The case of Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden264 deals with 
omission, which forms part of the wrongfulness requirement, as one of the elements 
necessary to constitute a delict.  The facts of the case are as follows: 
 
The respondent was the neighbour of one Brookes, who had a drinking problem and 
was inclined towards aggression when under the influence.  On the day in question 
Brooks, who was drunk again, threatened to his wife and two children.  His wife, who 
also had a firearm, sought the respondent‟s help, and gave her pistol to him.265  In 
the meantime Brooks killed his daughter, and then followed his wife and son and also 
shot them.  In the process of trying to help, the respondent was shot in the ankle and 
then in the shoulder, before he managed to ward off Brooks by firing the wife‟s pistol. 
In spite of the procedure to declare an individual unfit to be in possession of a firearm 
being reasonably, this procedure had not been followed notwithstanding its simplicity.  
Furthermore, despite the police knowing the Brooks‟ history of threatening to kill his 
family when under the influence, the former did no re-possess the firearm from 
Brooks.266  
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Regarding omission the court pointed out that the enquiry under the rubric of 
wrongfulness is whether “the negligent omission occurred in circumstances that the 
law regards as sufficient to give rise to a legal duty to avoid negligently causing 
harm”.  Further, it argued that “a negligent omission will only be wrongful if under the 
circumstances there was a duty to act positively to avoid causing harm”.267  The court 
referred to the dictum in the case of Minister van Polisie v Ewels and observed that 
“a negligent omission would only be regarded as wrongful if it was of such a nature 
that the legal convictions of the community regarded it as wrongful”.268  In addition, 
the court asserted that “the question to be determined is one of legal policy, which 
must perforce be answered against the background of the norms and values of the 
particular society in which the principle is sought to be applied”.269  According to Von 
Bonde270 the Constitution serves as the supreme source of the norms and values of 
South African society.  The court further added that a duty to prevent injury will more 
readily be placed on the state than on an individual because it is “the very business 
of a public authority of functionary to serve the interests of others”.271  It was further 
averred by the court that:272 
 
“It must also be kept in mind that in the constitutional dispensation of this country 
the state (acting through its appointed officials) is not always free to remain 
passive.  The state is obliged by the terms of section 7of the 1996 Constitution 
not only to respect but also to „protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of 
Rights‟ and section 2 demands that the obligations imposed by the Constitution 
must be fulfilled.” 
 
Questions as to whether the defendant could reasonably be expected to have taken 
any positive measures at all and, if so, what positive measures should reasonably 
have been taken, form part of the enquiry into negligence.273  Accordingly, the court 
endorsed the test for negligence propounded in Kruger v Coetzee,274 namely whether 
a reasonable person in the position of the party concerned would not only have 
foreseen the harm, but would also have acted to avert it. 
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3.3.2 CARMICHELE v MINISTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY (CENTRE FOR 
APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES INTERVENING)275 
 
The case of Carmichelle v Minister of Safety and Security276 is a landmark ruling 
detailing the breach of a legal duty by the state to protect its citizens.  It is important 
in determining the matter of omission as part of wrongfulness and to whom delictual 
liability will be imputed.  The pertinent details of the case are as follows: 
 
The plaintiff was attacked by a man who had a history of violent behaviour and 
indecent assault.  He had already been convicted of housebreaking and indecent 
assault.  On the housebreaking charge, he was sentenced to 18 months 
imprisonment, which was suspended conditionally for four years.  He was 
subsequently charged with the attempted rape and attempted murder of another 
victim in the area.  He was released on his own recognisance and, in the months 
while the latter two charges were being dealt with he attacked the plaintiff.  This was 
despite the fact that several people had phoned the police to report incidents 
involving the man.  The plaintiff had instituted action for alleged dereliction of duty by 
the latter persons.  
 
The high court had granted absolution from the instance on the ground that prima 
facie a duty of care had not been proved.  This finding was upheld by the supreme 
court of appeal.277  After overturning the finding of absolution from instance and 
referring the matter back to the high court, the court considered the plaintiff‟s cause 
of action to be founded solely on delict arising from a breach of duty owed her by the 
police and/or the prosecutor, providing a causal link was proved  between such 
breach and injuries suffered.  The court proceeded to consider in terms of the 
common law basis of the legal duty to act and concluded that the duty to act was 
based on reasonableness, namely whether it would be reasonable to expect a party 
to have taken positive measures to prevent the injury. 
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The Cape high court found that in the present case the Minister of Safety and 
Security had a legal duty to protect the plaintiff against the risk of sexual violence.278  
The constitutional duty to protect is enshrined in sections 10, 11 and 12, which deal 
with the right to “dignity, life, and freedom”.279  The court considered the plaintiff‟s 
cause of action to be founded solely on delict arising from a breach of a duty owed 
her by the police and/or the prosecutor, providing a causal link was proved between 
such breach and the injuries suffered.  The Constitutional Court was unambiguous 
regarding the fact that there was an obligation on all courts to develop the common 
law and to do so in keeping with the Constitution: 
 
“(U)nder the Constitution there can be no question that the obligation to develop 
the common law with due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights is an obligation which falls on all of our courts including this Court.”
280 
 
The court proceeded to consider in terms of the common law the basis of the legal 
duty to act and concluded that the duty to act was based on reasonableness, namely 
whether it would be reasonable to expect a party to have taken positive measures to 
prevent injury.281  The Constitution expanded on this test by stating the following: 
 
“[I]n determining whether there was a legal duty on the police officers to act, 
Hefer JA in Minister of Law and Order v Kadir
282
 referred to weighing and the 
striking of a balance between the interests of parties and the conflicting interest 
of the community.  This is a proportionality exercise with liability depending upon 
the interplay of various factors.  Proportionality is consistent with the Bill of 
Rights, but that exercise must now be carried out in accordance with the „spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights‟ and relevant factors must be weighed in 
the context of a constitutional state founded on dignity, equality and freedom and 
in which government has positive duties to promote and uphold such values …  
(T)he Bill of Rights entrenches the rights to life, human dignity and freedom of 
security of the person …  It follows that there is a duty imposed on the State and 
all its organs not to perform any act that infringes these rights”
283 
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The breach of the duty to protection could lead to the state being delictually liable; 
the court proceeded to state that:284 
 
“Fears expressed about the chilling effect such delictual liability might have on 
the proper exercise of duties by public servants are sufficiently met by the 
proportionality exercise which must be carried out and also by the requirement of 
foreseeability and proximity …  A public interest immunity excusing respondents 
from liability that they might otherwise have in the circumstances of the present 
case, would be inconsistent with our Constitution and its values.” 
 
3.3.3 MEDIA24 v GROBLER285  
 
The case of Media24 v Grobler286 is of relevance because it brings out the 
requirements for a successful delictual claim.  Firstly, I will give a summary of the 
facts and secondly, the decisions reached by the courts relating to vicarious and 
subsequently direct liability in that respect. 
 
The facts of the case concerned  the appeal of Media24 (the first appellant) against 
the decision by the Cape High Court to hold it vicariously liable for the sexual 
harassment  at work of Sonia Grobler (the respondent) by Gasant Samuels (the 
second appellant).  The respondent employee had been awarded damages of  
R776 814,00.287  The respondent‟s cause of action had been based on her assertion 
that the first appellant had breached its legal duty to its employees in terms of which 
it was required to maintain a working environment that protected and respected the 
dignity and mental well-being of its employees.  This would include taking all 
necessary steps to prevent, or end sexual harassment.  The court a quo had found 
the second appellant guilty of sexually harassing the respondent, and had then held 
first appellant vicariously liable for harassment. 
 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal, the first appellant argued as follows: 
 
 That the Cape High Court had erred in extending the principles of vicarious 
liability beyond those recognised in South African law, since the harassment 
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had not occurred within the course and scope of the second appellant‟s 
employment. 
 
 That the first appellant had not breached its legal duty to maintain a safe 
working environment, since the respondent had failed to prove that the first 
appellant had a duty to take positive measures to prevent harm.  The first 
appellant argued that there was no legal basis for such a duty to be imposed, 
but alternatively, if there was such a duty, that the first appellant had discharged 
it by implementing a sexual harassment policy and grievance procedure in 
1997.  The first appellant contended that any legal duty on the first appellant 
arose from the contract of employment between the parties. 
 
 Thirdly, the first appellant argued that the high court had not had jurisdiction to 
hear the matter, since it was an issue that fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Labour Court. 
 
The respondent contended as follows: 
 
 That the trial court had decided correctly in holding the first appellant vicariously 
liable for the sexual harassment. 
 
 In the alternative, that even if vicarious liability could not be extended to the first 
appellant, a legal duty to ensure a safe working existed.  The respondent 
argued that the first appellant had breached this duty by not taking any steps to 
halt the sexual harassment from occurring. 
 
In its judgment, the court in this instance felt that it was not necessary to examine the 
matter of vicarious liability, since it held that the respondent had satisfactorily proven 
that the first appellant could be held directly liable for the sexual harassment.  The 
court made reference to the cases of Van Deventer v Workman‟s Compensation 
Commissioner288 and Vigario v Afrox Ltd289 when reasoning this judgment.  In terms 
of these cases, the court found that our law recognised that an employer owes its 
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employees a common law duty of care.290  It further observed that this duty of care 
extended not only to the employee‟s physical harm, but was also applicable to hold 
the employer liable for not preventing psychological harm from happening.291 
 
The common law legal duty of care is grounded in the convictions of the community, 
and the court found that this duty of care was applicable to the matter in spite of the 
existence of the statutory remedy for sexual harassment in terms of section 60 of the 
EEA.  The court further held that the mere fact that a contractual relationship existed 
between the first appellant and the respondent did not preclude the application of the 
common law of delict to the matter.292 
 
With respect to the matter of jurisdiction the court averred that the matter fell outside 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court.  This reasoning was based on 
interpretation by the court of section 7(6) of the NEDLAC Code of Good Practice on 
the Handling of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace.293  According to this section  
 
“a victim of sexual assault has the right to press separate criminal and/or civil 
charges against an alleged perpetrator and the legal rights of the victim are in no 
way limited by this code”. 
 
The court stated that the meaning of “sexual assault” could be extended to that of 
sexual harassment, and that this meant that a “civil charge” could be taken to mean a 
civil action for damages – as the action of the respondent was a civil action for 
damages. In addition, it also held that since the matter dealt with the wrongfulness of 
the first appellant‟s conduct, the application of the judgment in the case of Fedlife 
Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt294was relevant here. In terms if this judgment, the matter 
is not solely reserved for the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, since the unlawfulness 
of the employer‟s conduct (in this instance the first appellant) would not be a matter 
requiring the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court as set out in section 157 of the 
LRA.295 
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Lastly, the court examined the respondent‟s contention that the first appellant had 
breached the duty of care it owed its employees to provide a safe working 
environment.  The court held that it was clear that the first appellant had not fulfilled 
this duty, since the management of the employer, despite being informed of the 
situation and requested to intervene, did nothing to prevent the harassment from 
occurring.  The court held that this failure on the part of management established the 
breach of the legal duty of care by the first appellant.296 
 
Mukheibir297 translates the Ewels298 decision, which was referred in this case, as 
follows: 
 
“It appears as if that stage of development has been reached where an omission 
may also be regarded as wrongful where the circumstances of the case are such 
that the omission not only gives rise to moral indignation, but also that the legal 
convictions of the society expect that the omission ought to be regarded as 
wrongful and that the damage suffered ought to be compensated by the person 
who failed to act positively.  To determine whether or not wrongfulness is present 
in the case of a particular omission is thus not a question about the usual 
„negligence‟ of the bonus paterfamilias, but rather whether with regard to all the 
facts there was a legal duty to act reasonably.” 
 
3.4 COMMON LAW - VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION TO COMMON LAW- VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
The South African doctrine of vicarious liability is largely based on the position in 
English law.299  The rule as formulated by Salmond300 constitutes the basis of the 
doctrine and it provides that the master is responsible for wrongful acts authorised by 
him and that: 
 
“[a] master is liable even for acts which he has not authorised, provided they are 
so connected with acts which he has authorised that they may rightly be 
regarded as modes-although improper modes-of doing them. … On the other 
hand if the unauthorised and wrongful act is not so connected with the authorized 
act as to be a mode of doing it, but is an independent act, the master is not 
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responsible; for in such a case the servant is not acting in the course of his 
employment, but has gone outside of it.” 
 
In Mkhize v Martens301 Innes JA stated the following: 
 
“We may, for practical purposes, adopt the principle that a master is answerable 
for the torts of his servant committed in the course of his employment, bearing in 
mind that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests and purposes and 
outside his authority is not done in the course of his employment, even though it 
may have been done during his employment.” 
 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the doctrine of vicarious liability and its 
application in case law.  Firstly, a definition of and reasons for vicarious liability will 
be provided.  Thereafter, the requirements for vicarious liability and their application 
and interpretation in case law will be explored.  A conclusion will sum up the chapter. 
 
Vicarious liability is a doctrine of liability without fault in terms of which one person is 
held for unlawful acts of another.302  It “militates against the basic requirements for 
delictual liability”: liability will be assigned without the responsible person being at 
fault or having acted wrongfully.303  In the context of the employment relationship, the 
employer can be held liable for the unlawful acts of an employee.304  In South African 
law, vicarious liability is a very real and potentially dangerous threat of which 
employers must become aware, especially those in labour intensive industries.  
Vicarious liability can be defined as follows: 
 
“A form of strict liability that arises under the common law where the superior 
remains liable for the actions (or omissions) of their subordinate, or, in a broader 
sense, the responsibility of any third party that had the „right, ability or duty to 
control‟ the actions of such subordinate, which actions lead to damage.”
305
 
 
Vicarious liability, while easy to define, becomes an exceptionally convoluted topic 
when dealing with real world examples.306  Different reasons have been advanced to 
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justify the existence of this doctrine which runs counter to the general principle of no 
liability without fault.307  The main reasons advanced are that the victim should enjoy 
fair and just compensation (out of the deeper pocket of the employer than the primary 
wrongdoer);308 that the employer is better equipped to spread the cost of 
compensating victims by taking out insurance and price increases309 and that 
employers will take to prevent employees from causing damage to third persons if 
they will be held liable for the acts of their employees.310  Determining the reasons for 
vicarious liability is essential in order to ascertain whether the rules are just.311  
Furthermore, knowledge of the justification of the positive legal requirements is 
necessary for the communication between the lawyer and the ordinary citizen.312  In 
addition, the reason for vicarious liability has to be sought in a number of policy 
considerations, not all of which are equally applicable to the different categories of 
vicarious liability. Important considerations are the creation of risk by the defendant in 
pursuit of his own interests and the possibility of loss distribution.313 
 
According to Greenberg AJ in Feldman v Mall314 there is no logical basis for vicarious 
liability, 
 
“but law is not always logical; on the very question underlying this liability, viz the 
reason why a master should ever be liable for acts of the servant who have 
committed in disregard of his express instructions, judges and commentators 
have found difficulty in finding a logically satisfying basis, and the way in which 
the rule has been applied is probably a compromise between conflicting 
considerations”. 
 
The theoretical foundation for the vicarious liability of an employer for the delicts of its 
employee has not received thorough analysis by South African courts.  Our courts 
have accepted that the doctrine was unknown to Roman and Roman Dutch law and 
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was inherited from English law and the courts therefore concentrated on the 
application of a set of rules in determining the liability of the employer.315 
 
3.5 REQUIREMENTS FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
The requirements for an employer‟s vicarious liability as formulated by South African 
courts are as follows: 
 
 There has to be an employer-employee relationship. 
 
 The employee has to commit a delict. 
 
 The employee has to act within the course and scope of his employment when 
committing the delict. 
 
 
In light of the above listed requirements a discussion of the requirements and 
relevant case law on their interpretation and application shall be explored in detail 
below. 
 
3.5.1 EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
 
An employer-employee relationship is a relationship in which “any person, excluding 
an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the State and who 
receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration”.316  This is a primary 
requirement and its importance emanates from the fact that an employer cannot be 
vicariously liable for the delictual acts of an independent contractor: the party at fault 
must be an employee and not an independent contractor.317  A central problem in 
determining the concepts of employer and employee concerns the relationship of 
those concepts to the contract of service.  The use of the same legal terms 
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(employer, employee, master, servant) in the field of vicarious liability and the 
contract of service indicates that the concepts are identical.318  It has, however, been 
submitted that they are entirely different in that they are entirely different in that the 
employer-employee relationship could be established even if the parties concluded a 
contract other than the contract of service.319  In short, a contract between employer 
and employee is not a requirement of liability.  But if a contract is present, it must be 
a contract of service.320  As vicarious liability is strict liability, an employer can 
therefore never be vicariously liable for the delict of an independent contractor.321 
 
3.5.1.1 MIDWAY TWO ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION SERVICES v 
TRANSNET BPK322 
 
The question of the existence of an employment relationship is essential in 
establishing vicarious liability. I shall discuss the facts and the judgment of the case 
of Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v Transnet Bpk which is 
significant in determining those deemed as employees and non employees for 
purposes of imputing liability. 
 
According to the facts, the service of a driver was made available to a client by a 
labour broker.  The Supreme Court of Appeal was called upon to determine whether 
the broker or the client was vicariously liable at common law for damage caused by 
the driver while driving for the client. 
 
Nienaber J in the above case observed that a multi-faceted test which takes all 
relevant factors into account in order to establish whether the relationship between 
the perpetrator and the defendant is an employer-employee relationship, is more 
appropriate and is useful to determine who, as a matter of policy and fairness, had 
been more closely associated with the risk-creating act.323  It is maintained that when 
applying this test, the client, and not the labour broker, was more closely associated 
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with the negligent act and was therefore vicariously liable.324  Although control is an 
important factor, it is not the most important criterion, as was previously the case.325  
Worth noting is the fact that independent contractors do not fall under the definition of 
employee in the Labour Relations Act (LRA), Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 
of 1997 (BCEA) and Employment Equity Act (EEA).326  In addition, the BCEA and the 
LRA record that a person whose service) is the employee of the labour broker (and 
not the client).327  It is therefore imperative to draw a distinction between an 
employee and an independent contractor.  Previously, common law courts and the 
Labour Court paid particular attention to the extent to which the employer controlled 
the employee,328 but now both the civil courts and the Labour Court favour what is 
referred to as the “dominant impression test”.329 
 
In conclusion, an employer is liable for the conduct of an independent contractor only 
if the employer was at fault himself.330 
 
3.5.1.2 STEIN v RISING TIDE PRODUCTIONS331 
 
An independent contractor is does not fall under the definition of employee and is 
therefore not an employee as far as vicarious liability is concerned.  Firstly, I shall 
briefly discuss the facts of the case and secondly, the relevance of the case to the 
requirement of “employer-employee relationship”. 
 
The facts of the case are as follows: a crew was hired to provide technical skills that 
R did not possess.  The crew brought their own equipment and used it without any 
direction from R and its employer subsequently invoiced R and received payment 
from R.332  The High Court had the task of establishing whether there was vicarious 
liability of a company (R) for a delict committed by the technical crew hired by R to 
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assist during a film shoot.  The Court relied on the dominant impression test to 
conclude that the technical crew was not an employee of R. 
 
3.5.1.3 THE EMPLOYEE HAS TO COMMIT A DELICT 
 
For the employer to be held liable for vicarious liability the elements of delict have to 
be proven.  The employer‟s liability for the conduct of an employee to a third party will 
arise if the employee‟s conduct satisfies the requirements for a delict.  There must 
therefore be an act or omission on the part of the employee, which was wrongful, 
which caused the damage or personal injury to the third person, and which was 
committed “intentionally or negligently”.333  These elements are necessary in order to 
establish a delict.  The employer may generally raise any defence which is available 
to the employee.334  The exception to this pertains to the defences that are not 
related to the quality of the deed itself or fault in respect thereof but that vest the 
employee with personal immunity.335 
 
3.5.2 THE EMPLOYEE HAS TO ACT WITHIN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF 
EMPLOYMENT WHEN COMMITTING THE DELICT 
 
The employee has to act within the scope of his employment when committing the 
delict.  The relevant cases to be discussed which pertain to this requirement and the 
test for the requirement include Minister of Police v Rabie; K v Minister of Safety and 
Security; Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd v Reddy; Bezuidenhout NO v Eskom 
and finally, Grobler v Naspers. 
 
There is no general rule for establishing the liability of an employer that can be 
applied to all South African cases involving vicarious liability.336  Broadly speaking, 
employees are acting in the scope of their employment when they carry out tasks 
authorised by the employer, even if they carry out the tasks by an unauthorized 
method.337  It is accepted that there are three phrases that reflect the requirement in 
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general terms: the delict must have been committed in the course/scope of the 
employment, in the exercise of the functions to which he is appointed, or in the duty 
or employment set to the employee.338  Gule339 concurs with the thought that “an 
aggrieved employee” would be unlikely to prove this, as there is no employee who 
can be said to be acting within the course and scope of his or her employment when 
he or she sexually harasses co-employees.  The implication of this dictum was that 
an employer could never be held vicariously liable for the “intentional wrongdoing 
(frolic of his own)” of an employee since such conduct would be regarded as being 
outside the scope of employment.340  The question whether the act falls within or 
outside the scope of employment has been described as a question of law, but it has 
also been said that each case will depend on its own facts.341  However, Watermeyer 
J in Feldman v Mall342 admitted that “the dividing line which separates acts within the 
scope of a servant‟s employment from those without is one impossible to draw with 
certainty”.343  
 
3.5.2.1 MINISTER OF POLICE v RABIE344 
 
In order to hold a person vicariously liable it is necessary to test whether they meet 
the requirements for such a test.  The test for vicarious liability was formulated in 
Minister of Police v Rabie as follows: 
 
“It seems clear that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests and 
purposes, although occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the course 
or scope of his employment, and that in deciding whether an act of a servant 
does so fall, some reference is to be made to the servant‟s intention.  The test in 
this regard is subjective. On the other hand, if there is nevertheless a sufficiently 
close link between the servant‟s act for his own interests and purposes and the 
business of his master, the master may yet be liable.  This is an objective test. 
And it may be useful to add that “a master is liable even for acts which he has not 
authorised provided that they are so closely connected with acts which he has 
authorised that they may be rightly regarded as modes – although improper 
modes of doing them.” 
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The subjective element of the test looks at whether the employee exclusively 
promoted his own interests and if this is indeed the case, the conduct could fall 
outside the scope of employment.345  A further objective test has, however, also been 
undertaken.  This test looks at whether, despite the fact that the employee was 
satisfying his own interests, there was not a “sufficiently close link” between the 
employee‟s own interests and the business of the employer. If there is such a link, 
the employer may be held vicariously liable.346  
 
In Minister of Police v Rabie a sergeant, employed by the South African Police Force 
as a mechanic, wrongfully assaulted and arrested someone against whom he had a 
personal grudge.  The employee was off duty at the relevant time, but he identified 
himself as a policeman when he arrested the person.  The appellate division held the 
Minister of Police vicariously liable on the basis that the acts of the policeman fell 
within the risk created by the state.  Jansen JA relied on the dictum in Feldman v 
Mall:347 
 
“[A] master who does his work by the hand of the servant creates a risk of harm 
to others, if the servant should prove to be negligent or inefficient or 
untrustworthy; that because he has created that risk for his own ends he is under 
a duty to ensure that no one is injured by the servant‟s improper conduct or 
negligence in carrying on his work” 
 
The court in Rabie contended that, even though the sergeant‟s work as a mechanic 
was limited to a time and place, his work as a policeman – which included 
questioning, arresting, escorting to a police station, and charging a suspect – was not 
so restricted.348  In the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, the sergeant 
could at any time and place perform his functions as a policeman, and it is 
conceivable that in some instances he might have been called upon to do so in the 
line of duty.349  According to the facts, the sergeant had identified himself as a 
policeman to Rabie when he arrested him, and in the circumstances it seemed 
reasonable and fair to infer that the sergeant had intended to exercise his authority 
as a policeman, and was, therefore, acting in the course and scope of 
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employment.350  It was put forward that the conduct of the sergeant was completely 
self-serving and in bad faith.  In addition, the sergeant had not been performing any 
of the functions set out in the Police Act 7 of 1958.351  Despite such evidence, 
vicarious liability was imputed on the employer on the basis that “there was a 
sufficiently close link between the servant‟s conduct for his own interests and 
purposes and the business of his master”.352 
 
From the above case it is observed that an employer may not escape liability if the 
employee acted solely for his own interests and purposes in a situation occasioned 
by his or her employment.  In addition, an employer is liable for acts that he/she did 
not authorise, provided that these acts are connected to acts that he/she did 
authorise.353  
 
The standard test for vicarious liability has been applied in K v Minister of Safety and 
Security. 
 
3.5.2.2 K v MINISTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY354  
 
Firstly, the pertinent facts of K v Minister of Safety and Security shall be outlined 
followed by a discussion of its applicability to the requirement in question. 
 
The requirement of scope of employment regarding vicarious liability of the employer 
was subsequently discussed in this case.  The court made reference to this 
requirement.  The facts of the case are as follows:  The plaintiff sought damages 
from the Minister of Safety and Security because she had been raped by three 
policemen who had given her a lift home in a police vehicle and whilst they were in 
uniform.  The Supreme Court of Appeal Scott JA identified this to be “a deviation 
case” and stated the following: 
 
“Whether the deviation was of such a degree that it can be said that in doing 
what he or she did the employee was still exercising the functions to which he or 
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she was appointed or authorised to do or still carrying out some instruction of his 
or her employer.” 
 
He further averred that the court failed to establish a sufficiently close link between 
the deviant acts of the policeman in pursuit of their own selfish interests and the 
business of the Minister.  This sort of reasoning was based on the notion that deviant 
conduct of the policemen was solely self-serving and was not authorised by the 
Minister, even though the wrongful acts were committed whilst working for the 
Minister. 
 
The Constitutional Court as per O‟Regan J submitted that the business of the 
Minister of Police creates a “foreseeable risk that people would trust policemen”, 
especially those on duty in uniform, and who are in police vehicle offering assistance 
to a member of the public.  The harm must be foreseeable and there must have been 
a close connection between the acts of the employee and the risk created by the 
business of the employer, or the instruction given by the employer in furtherance of 
the business interests.  O‟Regan J acknowledged the presence of such a close 
connection.355  When the policemen raped the victim they were on duty, patrolling the 
area to protect the public from the very act which they had committed.  O‟Regan 
pointed out that the courts should not hide beneath semantic discussions of the 
meanings of “the course and scope” and “mode of conduct” requirements, when 
imposing vicarious liability.  On the contrary, they should rather interpret these 
principles with the spirit and objects of the Constitution in mind.356  This means that 
courts must consider “the importance of the constitutional role entrusted to the police 
and the importance of nurturing the confidence and trust of the community in the 
police, in order to ensure that their role is successfully performed”.357 
 
3.5.2.3 COSTA DA OURA RESTAURANT (PTY) LTD v REDDY358 
 
The following case sheds more light on the application of “scope of employment” 
requirement.  The court in Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd v Reddy was called 
upon to determine whether the acts committed by the barman were in the course of 
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employment in order to establish whether the liability can be imputed on the 
employer.  The facts of the case are as follows: a barman assaulted a patron outside 
the bar.  The assault resulted from the remarks made by Reddy (the patron) about 
the barman‟s (Goldie) efficiency. Reddy afterwards tipped another barman 
excessively in front of Goldie.  Goldie was provoked and followed Reddy when he left 
the restaurant.  He attacked Reddy outside the restaurant.  Reddy claimed damages 
from the restaurant on the grounds of vicarious liability.  The court a quo observed 
that: 
 
“It was not a grudge which Goldie harboured against the plaintiff independently of 
his work situation.  It was a grudge which arose directly out of his work situation.  
The digression or deviation, if any from what Goldie was employed to do, and 
what he in fact did was so close in terms of space and time that it can reasonably 
be held that he was still acting within the course and scope of his employment.” 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal argued that the restaurant was not vicariously liable on 
the basis that the assault occurred after the barman had abandoned his duties.  The 
court further averred that: 
 
“It was a personal act of aggression done neither in furtherance of his employer‟s 
interests, nor under his express or implied authority, not as an incident to or in 
consequence of anything Goldie was employed to do.  The reasons for and the 
circumstances leading to up to the assault may have arisen from the fact that 
Goldie was employed by the restaurant as a barman, but personal vindictiveness 
leading to the assaults on patrons does not render the employer liable.”359 
 
Le Roux360 recognises the “dual capacity” approach which entails giving recognition 
to the reality that can serve a dual purpose and be both within and outside scope of 
employment. 
 
3.5.2.4 BEZUIDEIHOUT NO v ESKOM361 
 
Another case which attempts to shed light on the requirement of “scope of 
employment” is Bezudeinhout NO v Eskom. 
 
                                                 
359
  At 41H. 
360
   Le Roux “Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law, Policies and Processes” (2005) 85. 
361
   Bezuidenhout NO v Eskom (2003) 24 ILJ 1084 (SCA). 
 59 
In Bezudeinhout NO v Eskom, Oelofse, an Eskom employee, offered Louis Roux a 
lift in an Eskom bakkie, despite an express prohibition on giving lifts to members of 
the public.  On their way they were involved in an accident and taken to hospital. 
Roux suffered severe injuries, and for these his curator ad litem (Bezuidenhout) sued 
Eskom in delict for R2483 307,30 for damages on his behalf.  It was argued that 
Roux was a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the incident and that Oelofse was 
negligent.  The approach employed in determining vicarious liability in this case was 
that of “dual capacity” which attempts to give recognition to the reality that the “same 
deed can serve a dual purpose and be both within and outside the scope of 
employment”.362  This approach was employed in Union Government v Hawkins,363 
where it was observed that the mere fact that an employee whose function is to drive 
a vehicle and who has been ordered to drive to a given destination disobeys his 
employer‟s instructions by deviating from his prescribed route, and that if a collision 
occurs during this deviation because the employee is negligent, this does not in itself 
excuse the employer from liability.  The employee may still be engaged in the 
business of his employer whose instructions for the conduct of that business he has 
disobeyed.  This means that even when an employee makes a deviation solely for 
his own purposes, the employer may remain liable for any negligence committed by 
the employee while he is on the deviation. 
 
3.5.2.5 GROBLER v NASPERS364 
 
The case of Grobler v Naspers is very important in that, it critically analyses and re-
defines the concept of vicarious liability on the basis of policy considerations and the 
Constitution. 
 
The underlying policy of the doctrine of vicarious liability as well as the test for 
employer liability has recently been re-examined in the context of the vicarious 
liability of an employer for the sexual harassment of its employee by a supervisor.365  
The challenge faced by the court in this case was that, in the past, courts did not 
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provide guidelines on vicarious liability, on the premise that sexual harassment would 
always be against he employer‟s instructions and could not be described as being 
done in furtherance of the employer‟s business and therefore not within the scope of 
the employee‟s appointment.366 
  
The facts of Grobler v Naspers can be summarized as follows: The victim (Grobler) 
and the harasser (Samuels) had a very close working relationship and worked within 
the same group of companies, they were also employed by different entities – the 
victim by Naspers Tydskrifte and the harasser by Naspers Ltd.367  
 
The High Court stated that Grobler had, on a balance of probabilities, proved that 
Samuels had sexually harassed her.368  The court also observed that Samuels has 
harassed other employees besides Grobler and that the latter had suffered at least 
five serious incidents of sexual harassment, one of which occurred away from 
work.369  The incidents included “fondling of her breasts,370 stolen kisses,371 
smacking her on the bottom,372 making indecent comments of a sexual nature and 
calling her names such as Blondie”.373  Samuels was also described to be the blue-
eyed boy of his manager and this was identified as one of the reasons why the 
superiors to whom Grobler complained, resisted taking action.374  In addition, 
Samuels threatened to disclose the fact that Grobler‟s husband had a criminal record 
should she take action.375  The final incident which resulted in Naspers convening a 
disciplinary hearing, and subsequent dismissal of Samuels, occurred away from work 
involving “more indecent proposals and pointing a revolver at Grobler”.376  Grobler 
collapsed a week after the disciplinary enquiry and was unable to work since then. 
 
For the employer to be held vicariously liable, the requirement that the offender was 
actually employed by the employer and committed a delict while acting within the 
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course and scope of her employment must be met.377  It was held that in order to 
escape liability employers must try to show that, although employed by them, the 
offender was on a “frolic of his own” at the time he or she committed the delict.378  
Moreover, this was held to be simply too easy for employers to obtain refuge in the 
defence of “frolic of their own” or “not within the course and scope of employment” 
especially when this “frolic” has been as widely defined and “course and scope” has 
been as narrowly defined as they are in the ratio decidendi of older judgments.379  
This approach was not followed in Naspers Case on the grounds that it “does not 
recognise the wide occurrence of sexual harassment in the workplace and its far-
reaching emotional and psychological consequences”.380  In addition, it was 
contended by Nel J in Grobler v Naspers that nobody would actually be employed to 
perform their duties by means of sexual harassment and that such deeds by an 
employee – even at the workplace – would ordinarily be regarded as “a frolic of his 
own”, thus providing the employer with an almost perfect defence.381  To counter this 
Nel J submitted that, the extent of vicarious liability for sexual harassment against 
women in the workplace and children in the context of schools, clubs and churches 
has been broadened in foreign jurisdictions.382  He further argued that a case of 
vicarious liability for sexual harassment is seldom resolved by reference to previous 
court decisions for the reason that many decisions are based “on stereotyped 
expressions and generalisations of limited value from which no legal approach can 
be distilled”.383 
 
The justification for the extension of vicarious liability was based on the reasoning 
that vicarious liability, as in South Africa, “is not a rigid legal principle, but a fluid 
concept, founded in policy considerations that have the objective of effective 
compensation and deterrence of future harm, and flexible enough to take account of 
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changing social and economic circumstances as well as the changing nature of 
employment”.384 
 
In a bid to establish whether vicarious liability ought to be extended in the case of 
sexual harassment Nel J considered, viz the “supervisor” and “risk of enterprise” 
tests. The former test entails that the employer would be vicariously liable “if the 
harasser occupied a position of authority vis-à-vis the victim”.385  According to this 
approach “vicarious liability would always follow if the harassment resulted in a, 
detrimental employment action such as the failure to promote, dismissal, and change 
in conditions of employment”, etc.  Where no such detrimental action is associated 
with the harassment, the employer may escape liability by showing that he/she took 
reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment and that all forms of harassment were 
immediately remedied or that the victim unreasonably omitted to follow sexual 
harassment procedures.386 
 
The “enterprise risk” test requires that there be a significant connection between the 
creation and enhancement of a risk and the wrong that accrues there-from, even if 
unrelated to the employer‟s desires.387  In light of the above tests, Nel J observed 
that the relationship between Grobler and Samuels carried the inherent risk of sexual 
harassment:388 as the secretary/manager relationship is not only a relationship 
between a superior and a subordinate, but it is normally a very close relationship, in 
terms of time spent together, duties and physical proximity.389  The essential question 
when determining liability would be whether, in fairness, the employer could be said 
to have assumed the specific risk that materialised.  This test has, however, been 
criticised for, firstly, “denying that sexual harassment also occurs, albeit less 
frequently, in situations that are apparently risky”, and secondly, it is inadequate in its 
explanation of the employer‟s vicarious liability.390  
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It is submitted that the risk enterprise test, which was used in Minister of Police v 
Rabie,391 was finally rejected in Minister of Law & Order v Nqcobo.392  Le Roux393 is 
of the view point that the change of the standard test has resulted in judgments in 
vicarious liability having to be imputed on employers for the sexual harassment of 
their employees by their employees, even where the acts of the wrongdoers could 
almost certainly be described as “frolics” of their own and were expressly forbidden 
by the employer. 
 
The court concluded that South African law on vicarious liability – vested in policy 
considerations – is broad enough to hold Naspers vicariously liable in the 
circumstances.394 These policy considerations take into account factors such as “the 
risk of harm to others, fairness and the maintenance of good practice standards by 
employees, along with financial considerations as rationales for holding an employer 
vicariously liable”.395  Nel J in Grobler v Naspers refuted the former view and 
submitted that the High Court had ,in terms of s 173 of the Constitution, “inherent 
power to develop the common law”, which development must, in terms of s39(2) of 
the Constitution “promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights”.396  The 
court thereafter concluded that even if policy considerations did not justify holding 
Naspers vicariously liable, the constitutional duty to “protect the right to dignity and 
the right to freedom and security”, required that the rules regarding vicarious liability 
be extended to uphold these rights in the workplace.397 
 
Naspers was subsequently found liable and was ordered to pay Grobler R150 000 as 
general damages, R23 128 in respect of medical expenses, a further R47 348 for 
past loss of earnings and an amount for future loss of earnings and future medical 
expenses, subsequently calculated to be R556 338.398 
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The concept of “course and scope of employment” must be viewed broadly and that 
the employee‟s tasks should not be “dissected into its component activities,”399 but it 
could be that there is overemphasis on what the employee is engaged to do and the 
realities of employment are ignored.400  Furthermore, employment is regarded as a 
social activity which goes beyond the mere performance of an employee‟s tasks and 
which also is not performed in isolation.  It is imbued with relationships (with 
colleagues and third parties such as independent contractors, clients, learners, 
patients) that extend beyond the principal parties to the contract of employment.  It is 
further observed that these relationships arise out of employment and are not merely 
coincidental to employment.401  Employees are therefore expected to conduct these 
relationships within the boundaries of certain norms and exceeding these boundaries 
would be equivalent to harm caused by negligent driving and an employee causing 
harm by sexual harassment.402  Put differently, the test for vicarious liability should 
not be reduced to the “simple requirement that the wrongful act be committed by an 
employee” or to an enquiry whether, but for employment, the wrongful act would not 
have occurred.403  Le Roux404 argues that employment relationships have “spatial 
limits” which will be determined by the courts on a case by case basis.  These limits 
were mentioned by Griesel J in Isaacs v Centre Guards t/a Town Centre Security405 
concerning the vicarious liability for acts forbidden by employers: 
 
“In answering the question in the context of forbidden acts, an important 
distinction is drawn between a prohibition which limits the sphere of employment, 
on the one hand, and one which deals with conduct within the sphere of 
employment, on the other. Ngubetole v Administrator Cape & another 1975 (3) 
SA 1(A) at 10E and authorities referred to therein.  The general rule is that an 
employee who disregards a prohibition which limits the sphere of his employment 
is not acting in the course of his employment, but an employee who disregards a 
prohibition which only deals with his conduct within the sphere of his employment 
is not acting outside the course of his employment.”
406 
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3.6 CONCLUSION ON COMMON LAW - VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
Having examined different cases and the application of the concept of vicarious 
liability the author is of the view that the development of common development of the 
common law vicarious liability in Grobler v Naspers is welcome as it affords more 
protection to the vulnerable employee who in most instances is held liable when 
acting within the course of employment.  On the other hand employers ought to 
beware of employees who may abuse this vicarious liability to obtain insurance from 
their employers even in circumstances were employees were pursuing personal 
ambitions. 
 
From the foregoing it is submitted that the employer will find it difficult to escape 
liability in sexual harassment cases.  On the other hand, the “potential breadth of 
possible liability ought not to detract from its existence where it is just and reasonable 
that it should apply”.407  For instance, an employer will be held vicariously liable for 
the harm the negligent driver under his employ despite the fact that the former has 
educated and trained the driver.  Similarly, if the employer conducts sexual 
harassment awareness programmes and adopts appropriate sexual harassment 
policies and grievance procedures and an employee, despite this, sexually harasses 
another, the employer ought to be vicariously liable.408  This approach, while 
appearing unfair, serves the policy considerations underpinning vicarious liability and 
is consistent with the constitutional duties alluded to by Nel J in Grobler v Naspers. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, treatise has covered the definition of sexual harassment as recorded in 
legislation and from courts‟ interpretation of cases as well as from academic authors.  
Furthermore,  the circumstances in which an employer can be vicariously liable under 
statute was explored with reference to firstly, the Constitution and secondly, the 
Employment Equity Act and the manner  these statutes seek to protect employees‟ 
rights against sexual harassment and when liability will be imputed on employers. In 
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addition, measures that the employer can take to prevent harassment and 
consequently escape vicarious liability was looked into.  Finally, the treatise 
discussed the direct liability and vicarious liability of the employer under the common 
law.   
 
To summarise, definitions on what amounts to sexual harassment were provided.  
One accepted definition is provided in the Code of Good Practice409 which states that 
“sexual harassment is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that violates the rights 
of an employee and constitutes a barrier to equality in the workplace”.  The 
Employment Equity Act410 also provides for the definition of sexual harassment and 
states that sexual harassment is a “form of discrimination”. 
 
Both statutes and common law provide remedies for the employee who has been 
harassed in the workplace.411  Employees who suffer work-related harassment by 
fellow employees in circumstances in which the employer does not protect them, can 
neither institute action against their employer on the basis of vicarious liability, nor in 
terms of section 60 of the Employment Equity Act (EEA).412 
 
Where harassment has been established, remedy can be sought in terms of common 
law either directly or vicariously.  These are alternative remedies to the employee 
who has no recourse in terms of statutory provisions.  In direct liability, the elements 
of a delict have to be proven before the employer can be held liable.  The main 
element is that of wrongfulness in the form of “an act or an omission”.  In the case of 
vicarious liability, the employee has to prove all the elements of vicarious liability for 
liability to be imputed on the employer.  Vicarious liability has been defined as “a form 
of strict liability that arises under the common law where the superior remains liable 
for the actions (omissions) of their subordinate, or, in a broader sense, the 
responsibility of any third party that had the „right, ability or duty to control‟ the actions 
of such subordinate, which actions lead to damage”.413  The requirements for 
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vicarious liability have to be met before liability will be imputed.  The contentious 
requirement is that of “course and scope of employment”.414  
 
To conclude, the author observed that sexual harassment continues to affect every 
employee and employer on a daily basis.  This problem has serious negative 
consequences for the employee more than for the employer.  This is so for a number 
of reasons, namely: the employees lose their jobs which is their source of income 
and means of survival, continued employment is made virtually impossible in most 
instances, the employee frequently incurs unbudgeted medical costs, could incur 
psychological disorders caused by the harassment.  As a result, the reputation, 
dignity and privacy of the employee are infringed.  
 
On the other hand, the employer is more often concerned with preserving the 
financial gains and reputation of the business.  Therefore, the employer will at any 
cost attempt to distance himself from the delict and crimes committed by the 
employee.  It is the author‟s submission that the different imbalance of interests of 
the employer and employee may be taken as a clear indication of the reluctance of 
employers to stamp out effectively or remedy the problem of sexual harassment, as 
this has a potential of adversely affecting the name of the employer and 
subsequently the profits of the company. 
 
Reluctance by the employer to acknowledge the seriousness of sexual harassment 
has prompted the legislature to intervene by implementing legislation which 
recognises the rights of employees.  These rights are enshrined in the 
Constitution:415  Where “the right to dignity, the right to privacy, the right to equality” 
section is a welcome development and relief for employees in that they can institute 
action against their employer in the event of harassment.  It also affords employers 
the opportunity to address harassment by setting up grievance procedures.  It is the 
writer‟s proposition that the legislature and the employers should enact measures 
that are preventative more than curative.  Sexual harassment should be totally 
eliminated in the workplace, however, where such harassment has occurred curative 
measures ca be resorted to as a second solution to prevention.  In other words, pro-
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active measures are more effective and permanent; whereas reactive measures are 
temporary short lived and meant to redress the current situation. 
 
Sexual harassment is a significant barrier to the enjoyment of equality, especially for 
women, as it is a form of discrimination which violates the principle of equal 
treatment.416  The court in Grobler v Naspers417 was prepared to develop assertively 
the common law in order to assist the victim, whereas in the case of Ntsabo the 
Labour Court was confined to an order it deemed reasonable with regard to the 
provisions of the Employment Equity Act.418  Employers have the prerogative of 
protecting employees by creating a safe working environment.  Where such an 
environment is hostile because of harassment, the employer should be held liable, in 
terms of the Constitution419 and in terms of the Employment Equity Act.420 
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